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STEP UP TO THE BARGAINING TABLE:
A CALL FOR THE UNIONIZATION
OF MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
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INTRODUCTION

It has become a well known fact that one of the biggest businesses
2
in America today is professional sports. Despite tremendous financial
success, the reality of legal actions and labor struggles have too often
resulted in player strikes, lockouts and the use of replacement players.'
Although these labor and legal difficulties have impacted the athletes in
all four major United States sports leagues,4 minor league players in the
National Hockey League ("NHL") and Major League Baseball ("MLB")
systems have been unfairly and unjustifiably affected by the tenuous
relationship that currently exists between professional athletes and their
club owners.5 Minor league hockey and baseball players are not
2. See Lisa A. Delpy & Kathleen B. Costello, Lawyering on the Front Lines: On-Site Legal
Counselfor Major Sporting Events, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 29 (1995).
3. See MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE DIFFERENT BALLGAME, THE SPORT AND BUSINESS OF
BASEBALL 109, 114, 118, 254, 350 (1991). Baseball has had strikes in 1972, 1981 and 1995 and
lockouts in 1975-1976, 1990 and a two day walkout in 1985. See id. The National Football League
had a strike in 1974, and 1987 where "scab" replacement players were used. See id. The National
Hockey League went on strike during the 1992 and the 1994-1995 seasons. See Shant H. Chalian,

Fourth and Goal: PlayerRestraints in ProfessionalSports,A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 67 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 593, 617, 623 (1989).
4. See generallyMILLER, supra note 3 (noting that the four major sports leagues in the United
States are Major League Baseball, the National Hockey league, the National Basketball Association
and the National Football League).

5. See Lee Lowenfish, Fielder'sNonchoice: MinorLeaguers Must Choose: Side With Owners

Who Exploit Them? Or a Union That Snubs Them?, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 21, 1995, at 122. Minor
league baseball players were asked by major league clubs during spring training of the 1995-1996
season to report to replacement player camps and if they refused, they would have had to train
alongside the replacement players anyway. See id. The striking Major League Baseball Players
Association asked the minor leaguers not to train alongside scabs. See id; see also If Players Strike,
NHL May Use Replacements, BERGEN REC., Mar. 12, 1992, at E4 (stating that National Hockey
League owners may look for replacement players in the event of a strike). Curt Leichner, General
Counsel to the Professional Hockey Players Association, said at least two general managers had
talked this option over with two minor-league teams and threatened to suspend any player who

refused to be a replacement. See id.; see also NHL RecruitingMinor-Leaguers, Player Rep Says,

VANCOUVER SUN, Mar. 11, 1992, at D10 (discussing the fact that as contract talks between the
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members of the N-L and MLB players unions, the National Hockey
League Players Association ("NHLPA") and the Major League Baseball
Players Association ("MLBPA"), respectively. 6 However, the minor,
alternative and developmental leagues of the National Hockey League
have been unionized by the Professional Hockey Players Association
("PHPA"). 7 The minor league players of MLB are not as fortunate as
they have not been unionized by the MLBPA or any other union.8 As
a result, the minor leagues of baseball and the leagues represented by the

PI-PA differ greatly in terms of wages, hours, working conditions and
the amount of control retained by the players over their careers.
This Note will focus on the restrictive conditions imposed on the
minor league baseball athlete. In order to thoroughly evaluate this issue,
it is necessary to examine the antitrust exemption MLB presently enjoys.
As a result, case law and commentaries will demonstrate that the entire
business of baseball should be covered under the antitrust exemption.'
Although an argument can be made to restrict MLB's antitrust exemption
to the reserve clause, this Note emphasizes the weakness of this view,
which leads to the conclusion that the antitrust exemption will stand in
its present form.
The antitrust exemption grants MLB preferential treatment that the
other professional sports leagues in the United States do not receive."0
National Hockey League and the National Hockey League Players Association stall, the league seems
to be looking to the minors to fill its teams); Tough Spot ForJuniors,CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 12,
1992, at F2 (reporting that the General Manager and President of the NHL's Edmonton Oilers, Glen
Sather, stated that he will field a replacement team if a strike occurs and that draft picks realize that
the decision whether or not to be a replacement player is a hard one to make).
6. See Deborah L. Spander, The Impact of Piazza on the Baseball Antitrust Exemption, 2
UCLA ENT. L. REv. 113, 129 (1994).
7. See Telephone Interview with Richard Evans, Director of Legal & Business Affairs for the
Professional Hockey Players Association (Feb. 16, 1996). Respectively, the three leagues are: the
American Hockey League, the International Hockey League, and the East Coast Hockey League. See
id.
8. See ANDREV ZmmALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG
BusINEss OF OuR NATIONAL PASTIME 178-80 (1992).

9. See generally Deborah L. Spander, The Impact of Piazza on the Baseball Antitrust
Exemption, 2 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 113 (1994) (concluding that based on the recent Piazza decision,
the antitrust exemption in baseball is limited to the reserve system).
10. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, supranote 8. See, e.g., Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n,
401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (stating that basketball does not enjoy the exemption from the federal antitrust
laws); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (testing the application of the
antitrust laws to professional football. The case was dismissed and the Court refused to extend the
antitrust exemption of baseball to the sport of football holding that the exemption should be limited
to baseball); International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1955) (involving a civil
antitrust action against defendants engaged in the business of promoting professional championship
boxing matches. The Court refused to extend the exemption of baseball to boxing); Philadelphia
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In particular, the antitrust exemption affords MLB a tremendous
11
advantage in structuring and managing minor league baseball.
Specifically, notable attention will be given to the presence of the reserve

system 12 which still exists in minor league baseball, although no longer

present in the major leagues.13 The reason for this inconsistency is that
the reserve system was bargained out through the collective bargaining
process by the MLBPA in 1976.14 Since minor league baseball players
are not represented by the MLBPA, is rules and conditions are unilaterally imposed by the owners of the minor league clubs and major league
clubs, which are collectively referred to as the National Association of
16
Professional Baseball Clubs ("National Association").
Because the labor exemption precludes MLB from being sued for
17
illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act ("Sherman

World Hockey Club, Inc., v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(issuing a preliminary injunction against a further use of the reserve system in the National Football
League).
11. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, at 180-81.
12. Previously, paragraph 10(a) in the Uniform Player's Contract of Major League Baseball
stated that the owners had a right to renew an unsigned baseball player for one year. See MARVIN
MILLER, A WHOLE DIFFERENT BALLGAME, THE SPORT AND BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 238 (1991).
The owners contended that if a player and a team could not agree on salary or conditions of a
contract, the team could automatically renew the player's last contract for one additional year. See
id. According to the owners the renewal of a prior contract would occur without the player's
signature. See id. Thus, the right of renewal had no foreseeable limit. See id. This created the right
for a team to renew a player's contract forever. See id. at 239. The only alternative a player had if
he wished to challenge this was to quit playing baseball for a living. See id. In addition, inactive
players were still owned for life by the last club played for. See id. In effect, this prevented those
players that had retired, or those who wished to retire in order to circumvent the system, from
coming back with another club. See id. The Uniform Player's Contract was incorporated into the
1968 collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 94. Therefore, the form of the player's individual
contract could no longer be changed unilaterally by the MLB owners. See id. Changes made to a
player's contract would now require agreement through collective bargaining. See id.The Major
League Baseball Players Association contended that the plain words of paragraph 10(a) of the
contract gave the club a one year option on a player's services after his contract had expired. See
id. at 41. The union argued for a one year renewal, nothing more than that. See id.
13. See ZIMBALIST,supra note 8, at 180-81. The reserve system in Major League Baseball had
been in place in some form since 1879. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A
PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG BusINEss OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 4 (1992).
14. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, at 21. As a result of the collective bargaining process that
occurred in 1976, free agency was granted to major league baseball players with six years of major
league experience. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 8, at 21.
15. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 8.
16. See Deborah L. Spander, The Impact of Piazza on the Baseball Antitrust Exemption, 2
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 113, 156 n.7. The Professional Baseball Rules are the rules that govern the
minor leagues. See id.
17. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG
BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 178-80 (1992). The Sherman Act of 1890 provides for broad
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Act"), a legal remedy is not available to the minor league baseball

player.18 Therefore, the best option for minor league baseball players is
to unionize.

In order to illustrate this point, the Professional Hockey Players
Association, which represents the players in the International Hockey
League, the American Hockey League, and the East Coast Hockey
League, will serve as the basis for much of the analysis and comparison
to the feasibility of unionizing minor league baseball.19 The reasons for
unionization of minor league hockey and the history of antitrust action
in professional hockey will also be examined to draw an accurate parallel
to major league baseball. This Note concludes by demonstrating that the
success of the PHPA should be expanded and paralleled to minor league
baseball.
IX. THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
A.

The Supreme Court Decisions

The Supreme Court first had the occasion to examine the antitrust
issue as it pertains to Major League Baseball in the landmark case of
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs.20 The Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore
was a member of the Federal League of Baseball Players, essentially a

condemnation of anticompetitive agreements restraining interstate commerce. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2
(1990). Specifically, § I states that "[e]very contract, combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States... is declared to be illegal." Id. §2 of the Sherman Act
states that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States. .. ." Id. In order to invoke the rules and provisions enumerated within the National
Labor Relations Act, the employment in question must affect interstate commerce. See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-152(7) (1994). The National Labor Relations Act expressly defines "commerce" as "trade,
traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several states .. "Id.§ 152(6). The
Supreme Court has held that the National Labor Relations Act prohibits only "unreasonable restraints
of trade." Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911). Certain practices are so
unreasonable that they are illegal per se. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1956).
18. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1992). Section I of the Sherman Act provides, in pertinent part:
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in the restraint of
trade of commerce among the several states... is declared to be illegal." In Northern Pac.Ry. Co.,
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that only those agreements that "unreasonably" restrain
trade come within the proscription of the Act. See 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
19. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 17.
20. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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rival league of MLB.?2' The Baltimore baseball club was literally left
without any competition, allegedly because MLB bought some of the
clubs in the Federal League and induced the remaining teams to leave the
league.' Additionally, the Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore was
unable to sign players to play on its team due to the reserve clauses
contained within the contracts of MLB players.' The plaintiff sued
24
MLB for restraint of trade violations under the Sherman Act. The
Supreme Court held that the business of baseball was not within the
scope of the Sherman Act because "the business is giving exhibitions of
25 and therefore the conduct of
baseball, which are purely state affairs,
26
MLB was not interference with commerce among the states.
Although the Federal League was defunct, a new threat began to
challenge MLB following World War H.' A new baseball league in
2
Mexico began to bid for the services of MLB players. ' As a result of
numerous players "defecting" to Mexico, MLB implemented a rule
placing a five year playing ban on all United States players who jumped
to the Mexican League.29
0
MLB enforced this rule strictly to thwart its competition. For
3
example, in Gardella v. Chandler, Danny Gardella was unsuccessful

21. See id. at 207.
22. See id.
23. See id.; see also Deborah L. Spander, The Impact of Piazza on the Baseball Antitrust
Exemption, 2 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 113, 156 n.33 (noting that due to the nature of the contracts
written by the American and National Leagues at that time, players were bound to their clubs on a
year to year basis and if the player did not resign with his club, he would be ineligible for that year.
This created a monopoly over the players for the National and American Leagues).
24. See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc., 259 U.S. at 200; see also discussion supra
note 17.
25. See id. at 208.
26. See id. at 209. Writing this opinion, Justice Holmes cited to the case of Hooper v.
California, 155 U.S. 648, 655 (1895), stating, "the transport is a mere incident, not the essential
thing." Id. Andrew Zimbalist points out that Justice Holmes was a former amateur baseball player
and wrote this opinion for a court headed by former President William Howard Taft, a former third
baseman at Yale and the first president to throw out a baseball to open a season. See ANDREW
ZIMBAuST, BASEBALL AND BILLtONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG BUSINESS OF OUR
NATIONAL PASTIME 10 (1992).
27. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG
BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 178-80 (1992).
28. See id. at 12. The first attempt at unionizing baseball was made at the same time that this
competition began to develop in the Mexican League. Although the attempt was unsuccessful,
owners recognized the threat of unionization and as a result, they improved wages, working
conditions and benefits for the players. See id.
29. See id. at 12-13.
30. See id.
31. 172 F.2d 402, 403-05 (2d Cir. 1949).
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in his attempt to return to MLB from Mexico before the five year ban
had elapsed.3 2 Gardella subsequently challenged the ruling by suing
MLB, alleging MLB was engaged in interstate commerce because the
owners contracted with television and radio broadcasting companies to
broadcast their games across state lines thereby subjecting MLB to
federal antitrust law. 3 Although Gardella lost his first case, he appealed
to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which found in his favor and
remanded the case.34 Fearing the decision of the lower court, MLB
Commissioner Happy Chandler reinstated Gardella, thereby averting a
possible reversal of FederalBaseball based on the distinguished facts
highlighted by the Second Circuit.3
Subsequent to the issuance of the Gardella decision, the Supreme
Court revisited the baseball antitrust exemption issue in Toolson v. New
York Yankees.3 6 George Toolson brought this suit after refusing to play
for a minor league team of the New York Yankees to which he had been
reassigned. 7 As a result, he was blacklisted shortly thereafter by all
other professional baseball clubs.38 Toolson's complaint alleged that the
reserve clause constituted a federal antitrust violation.39 Relying on the
fact that Congress had considered baseball's exemption from the federal
antitrust laws and had not acted on the issue, the Supreme Court held

32. See id.Gardella was a baseball player with a contract to play exclusively for the New York
Giants. See id. He violated this contract by jumping to the Mexico League, in direct contradiction
to the reserve clause found in the contract. See id. The reserve clause in these contracts required a
player whose contract expired with a club to only play for that club. See id.
33. See id.at 406.
34. See id. at 406-15 (discussing the reserve clause found in Gardella's contract, Circuit Judge
Frank compared it to "involuntary servitude," and stated that "no court should strive ingeniously to
legalize a private (even if benevolent) dictatorship." Additionally, Judge Frank distinguished the
Federal Baseball decision by noting the differences in the interstate commerce examined in Gardella
as opposed to FederalBaseball).
35. See MAPvrN MILLER, A WHOLE DIFFERENT BALLGAME: THE SPORT AND BusiNEss OF
BASEBALL 178-80 (1991).
36. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aftd, 200 F.2d 198
(9th Cir. 1952), affd, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
37. See id. at 93.
38. See id.
39. See id. Plaintiffs sued under the Sherman Antitrust Act sections 1-7. See id. Plaintiffs
alleged that organized baseball, through its illegal monopoly and unreasonable restraints of trade,
exploited the players who attracted the profits for the benefit of the club and leagues. See Toolson,
346 U.S. at 364. Among other allegations, the plaintiffs additionally alleged that the owners entered
into a combination, conspiracy, and monopoly in an attempt to monopolize professional baseball in
the United States. See id.
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40
that Federal Baseball should be reaffirmed. In fact, the underlying
4
issues of Toolson's case were not even re-examined by the Court. '
Toolson was founded entirely on the prior reasoning of FederalBaseball
determining "that Congress had no intention of including the business of
42
baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws." Lower courts
43
subsequently applied the holding in Toolson, but did so with reservation.4
Most recently, the fate of MLB's antitrust exemption was decided
4
by the Supreme Court in Flood v. Kuhn." Curt Flood was a twelve year
veteran of the major leagues and at the age of thirty-two was traded from
the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies without his knowledge
or consent. 6 Flood subsequently petitioned MLB Commissioner Bowie
47
Kuhn to void the trade and allow him to become a free agent. Not
surprisingly, Flood's request was denied, and he then brought suit against
MLB directly challenging professional baseball's reserve clause under the
48
antitrust laws of the United States.
Justice Blackmun authored an opinion holding that FederalBaseball
should be reaffirmed because of the doctrine of stare decisis and the

40. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. The Court further stated that "we think that if there are evils
in this field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust law it should be done by legislation."
Id.
41. See id. at 357.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966) (holding that state
antitrust laws were no longer applicable to baseball).
44. See Salerno v. American League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970).
Relying on FederalBaseball, Toolson and Gardella,Judge Friendly affirmed the holdings in these
cases but noted that Federal Baseball was not one of Justice Holmes' "happiest days... the
distinction between baseball and other professional sports is 'unrealistic,' 'inconsistent' and
'illogical."' Id. at 1005. Although Friendly did adhere to these decisions, he also noted that his
fellow judges "should not fall out of our chairs with surprise at the news that FederalBaseball and
Toolson had been overruled .... d.
45. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
46. See id. at 258; see also ANDREW ZImALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK
INSIDE THE BIG BusINEsS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 18 (1992) (noting that Flood was a "slick
fielding outfielder who batted over .300 six times in his major league career.").
47. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 265.
48. See id. at 264. Flood charged violations of the federal antitrust laws, civil rights statutes,
violations of state statutes, the common law, the imposition of involuntary servitude to the Thirteenth
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 1581, and 29 U.S.C. §§ 102-103. See id. at 265-66.
Pursuant to the powers of the federal antitrust laws, Flood sought declaratory and injunctive relief
combined with treble damages. See id.
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inactivity of Congress in passing superseding legislation. 9 However, the
Court did find that "professional baseball is a business and it is engaged
in interstate commerce."50 Of note, this conclusion was not reached in
either of the two previous Supreme Court decisions examining the
antitrust exemption in MLB.5 Flood argued that other professional
sports leagues did not enjoy the same exemption as MLB and as such,
the fact that baseball's reserve system did have the benefit of this
exemption was "an anomaly" and "an aberration." 52 The Court agreed

that this was an aberration, but a well established one, that had been

reaffirmed through the doctrine of stare decisis; therefore, it would not
be overruled by the judiciary branch of government. 3 Seemingly, the
antitrust exemption was firmly entrenched because of the Flood opinion.
However, as of late, the exemption has been judicially tested resulting in
varying interpretations of the Supreme Court's reasoning.
B.

The Piazza Decision

The plaintiffs in Piazza v. Major League Baseball' alleged that
MLB unlawfily restricted their efforts to purchase and relocate the San
Francisco Giants Baseball Club to Tampa Bay, Florida.55 Accordingly,

49. See id. at 285. The Court stated that "what the Court said in Federal Baseball in 1922 and
what it said in Toolson in 1953, we say again here in 1972: the remedy, if any is indicated, is for
congressional, and not judicial, action." Id.
50. Id. at 282.
51. See generally Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356; Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc., v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
52. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. See, e.g., Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204
(1971) (stating that basketball does not enjoy the exemption from the federal antitrust laws);
Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (testing the application of the antitrust
laws to professional football. The case was dismissed and the Court refused to extend the antitrust
exemption of baseball to the sport of football holding that the exemption should be limited to
baseball); International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1955) (involving a civil antitrust
action against defendants engaged in the business of promoting professional championship boxing
matches. The Court refused to extend the exemption of baseball to boxing); Philadelphia World
Hockey Club, Inc., v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (issuing a
preliminary injunction against a further use of the reserve system in the National Football League).
53. See id.
54. 831 F. Supp. 420, 421 (E.D. Pa. 1993). The two investors that were plaintiffs in the case
were Piazza and Tirendi. See id.
55. See Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 421. On August 6, 1992, the investors had secured a letter of
intent from the owner of the San Francisco Giants, Bob Lurie, to purchase the Giants. See id.
Pursuant to this agreement, Lurie was not supposed to negotiate with anyone else regarding the sale
of the Giants. See id. MLB must approve the sale of a baseball club and as such, the investors
submitted an application to MLB to purchase and relocate the franchise to Tampa Bay. See id. In
a knowing violation of Lurie's exclusive agreement with the investors, an official from MLB directed
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16
MLB was sued, in pertinent part, for violating federal antitrust laws.
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that MLB had monopolized the market
sale, transfer,
for MLB teams and had placed restraints on the "purchase,
7
teams.""
such
for
competition
relocation of, and
MLB moved to dismiss this case based on the contention that the
of baseball,
FederalBaseball exemption applied broadly to the business
8 In a decision
inactionable
were
claims
present
the
such,
as
and
deviating from prior precedent, the Piazza court held9 that the antitrust
exemption was only limited to the reserve clause. In reaching this
decision, Judge Padova examined the three Supreme Court decisions
6
known as the "Baseball Trilogy."
Analysis of these cases led the Piazza court to conclude that the
facts of each of these three cases dealt specifically with the reserve
in these
system and reserve clause in MLB, and therefore, the holdings
61
Although
cases.
cases should be confined to the specific facts in those
the antitrust exemption may have applied to the business of baseball
between 1922 and 1972,62 Judge Padova argued that with the writing
of the opinion in Flood "any precedential value those cases [Federal
Baseball and Toolson] may have had beyond the particular facts there
63
involved, i.e., the reserve clause," was removed. According to Padova,
the Flood Court rejected the reasoning in FederalBaseball' by using

Bill
Lurie to consider other offers. See id. Ultimately, with the aid of National League President
See id.
White, the Giants were sold to an investor who would keep the team in San Francisco.
id. at 422,
Interestingly, the sale was made for a lower price than that offered by the investors. See
423.
MLB
56. See id. at 423. The applicable federal claim for this discussion filed by Piazza against
§§ 1was an assertion of violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See 15 U.S.C.
"[e]very
that
provides
Act
Sherman
the
of
2
section
part,
pertinent
In
1993).
Supp.
&
1973
2 (West
any other
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
several
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
(1994).
2
§
U.S.C.
15
"
..
felony
a
of
states... shall be deemed guilty
restrained
57. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 423. Therefore, plaintiffs alleged they were unlawfully
id.
See
baseball.
of
business
the
from engaging in
58. See id. at 421.
59. See id. at 438.
60. Id. at 420-35. The cases forming the "Baseball Trilogy" are FederalBaseball, Toolson and
Flood.See id.
61. See id. at 435.
62. See id. at 435. Citing authority to the cases of FederalBaseballand Toolson as granting
this wide exemption to the business of baseball as opposed to simply the reserve clause. See id.
63. Id.
64. See id. According to Padova, the holding in FederalBaseballwas based upon the finding
not
that the business of professional baseball, as opposed to the business of moving players, was
L.
Spander,
Deborah
See
laws.
antitrust
federal
the
to
interstate commerce and therefore not subject
The Impact of Piazza on the BaseballAntitrust Exemption, 2 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 113, 119 (1994).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol14/iss1/6

10

Szuchman: Step Up to the Bargaining Table: A Call for the Unionization of M

19961

Unionization ofMinorLeague Baseball

the phrase "[p]rofessional
baseball is a business ... engaged in
65
interstate commerce.,
Citing this language as undercutting "the precedential value of the
reasoning of FederalBaseball,"66 in Padova's opinion, the Flood Court
sought to justify the precedential value of that result.6 7 To explain this,
Padova cites four factors the Flood Court examined when looking at
Toolson,6S and concludes that the Flood Court viewed the disposition
in Federal Baseball and Toolson as being limited to the reserve
system.69 However, in the actual opinion of Flood, after these four
factors are noted, the Court states, unequivocally, that the determination
in Toolson, as illustrated in Federal Baseball, was that "[c]ongress had
no intention to include baseballwithin the reach of the federal antitrust
70
laws.
The Flood Court proceeded to examine subsequent Supreme Court
decisions citing Toolson.71 In United States v. Shubert,72 Chief Justice
Warren discussed the Toolson decision by stating that for over thirty
years the decision of the Court 'Tixing the status of the baseball business
under the antitrust laws and more particularly the validity of the so-called
'reserve clause"' 73 allowed baseball to grow and develop.7 4
Justice
Warren then concluded that the Toolson Court adhered to Federal
Baseball in the sense that Congress had never intended to include "the
business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws."'75
Another argument contradicting Padova's position is set forth in
Radovich v. NationalFootballLeague.76 In that opinion, noting Federal

65. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 420 (quoting Flood, 407 U.S. at 282). See generally Federal
Baseball, 259 U.S. at 207 (finding that the business of baseball was not engaged in interstate
commerce).
66. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 420.

67. See id.
68. See id. These four factors are as follows: (a) Congress was aware of the decision in Federal
Baseball and for three decades never acted to overrule it through legislation, (b) Baseball was left
to develop during those three decades with the knowledge that the reserve system was not subject
to federal antitrust laws, (c) The fact that the Court was reluctant to overrule Federal Baseball
because of a fear of retroactive effects, (d) A remedy should be elicited through legislation rather

than judicial decision. See id
69. See id.
70. Flood,407 U.S. at 274 (emphasis added).
71. See id.
72. 348 U.S. 222 (1955).

73. Flood,407 U.S. at 275 (quoting Shubert, 348 U.S. at 228-30).
74. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 275.
75. Shubert, 348 U.S. at 229-30.

76. 352 U.S. 445 (limiting the antitrust exemption to baseball while not extending it to
football); see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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Baseball and Toolson, the Court refused to extend the antitrust exemption
to professional football stating the exemption would only stand for the
facts of Federal Baseball and Toolson, which were "the business of
77
organized professional baseball." The Flood Court repeated the
holding of Toolson, reaffirming the judgment below on the authority of
Federal Baseball stating that Congress did not intend to include the
7
business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws. " In
fact, other courts have followed the logic of this argument to uphold the
antitrust exemption for MLB.79
Although these cases are in opposition to the reasoning utilized in
Piazza, an argument can still be made that Judge Padova had solid legal
80
ground to arrive at his conclusion. However, due to the recent
developments in the world of sports concerning relocation of sport
franchises,81 it is now extremely unlikely that Congress would act to

77. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added).
78. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 279.
79. See Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978). In Finley, Charles 0.
Finley was the owner of the Oakland Athletics baseball club. See id. In 1976, Finley negotiated the
sale of three of his players to other teams. See id. Commissioner Kuhn voided the sale of these
players and Finley subsequently brought suit arguing conspiracy under the federal antitrust laws. See
id. In finding for the Commissioner, the Seventh Circuit noted that although there were references
to the reserve system in Flood, the record of the "Trilogy" and Radovich made it clear that the
Supreme Court meant to exempt the entire business of baseball, not simply the reserve system. See
id. at 541; see also New Orleans Pelicans Baseball, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Prof'l Baseball
Leagues, Inc., No. 93-253, 1994 WL 631144, at *20 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 1994) (agreeing with the
Finley court's interpretation of the baseball exemption while rejecting the "cramped view" of
Piazza); Professional Baseball Schs. & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d 1085, 1086 (1lth Cir. 1982)
(concluding that the business of baseball including the franchise relocation system was exempt from
antitrust laws).
80. See Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 420. The core of that argument is found in the Flood opinion
and extensively assembled by Judge Padova for the Piazza decision. See id. After concluding that
the Flood Court limited the previous disposition to the reserve clause, Padova cited passages that
lend credibility to his argument. See id. First, it is stated that Toolson is a narrow application of stare
decisis. See id. at 435; see also Flood,407 U.S. at 276. Second, it is noted that in framing the issue
of the case, the Flood Court stated this was the third time in fifty years the Supreme Court would
have to rule on the antitrust exemption of the reserve clause found in major league baseball. See
Piazza, 831 F.Supp. at 435; Flood, 407 U.S. at 259. Next, it is shown that the Flood Court
concluded that Congress had not sought to subject baseball's reserve system to antitrust law. See
Flood, 407 U.S. at 259. Finally, it is also illustrated from Flood that the reserve system inbaseball
is an anomaly. See Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 435, 436. All lend credibility to the Piazza decision.
81. See Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REv. 643, 703-11 (1989); see
also Steve Rushin, The Heartof a City, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 4, 1995, at 58 (describing the
move of the Cleveland Browns to Baltimore); Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee
Antitrust,Business Rights and Competition Subcommittee, The Application of FederalAntitrustLaw
to ProfessionalSports Team FranchiseRelocations, 102nd Cong., (1996) (publishing statement of
Gary Roberts, Professor of Law and Sports Law Program Director at Tulane Law School discussing
the recent decisions to move the following National League Football franchises: the Rams from Los

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol14/iss1/6

12

Szuchman: Step Up to the Bargaining Table: A Call for the Unionization of M

1996]

Unionization of Minor League Baseball

strip baseball of its antitrust exemption.8 2 Realizing that the Supreme
Court defers to the legislative process as the mechanism of choice to
override the antitrust exemption,83 it seems unlikely the Supreme Court
would overrule seventy-four years of precedent based on a tenuous
reading of Flood. Therefore, this Note concludes that the antitrust
exemption will continue to remain intact if either Piazza or any other
similar case is tested by the Court.
C. The Butterworth Decision
In 1994, the Florida Supreme Court decided a second case arising
out of the attempted relocation of the San Francisco Giants to Tampa
Bay in Butterworth v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs.84 Florida Attorney General Butterworth brought this case acting
upon an antitrust civil investigation demand ("CID"). 8 5 The Florida
Supreme Court held that MLB's antitrust exemption extends only to the
reserve system, and therefore the CID initiated by the Attorney General
could proceed.86 The rationale of the Piazza decision was now adopted
by a second court. This second opinion demonstrates that a potential
trend is developing in the lower courts of our country. However, the
present state of the law, as decreed by the Supreme Court, maintains a
broad antitrust exemption applicable to the business of baseball.

Angeles to St. Louis; the Oilers from Houston to Nashville; and the Browns from Cleveland to
Baltimore. Also, the prior moves of Oakland to Los Angeles and then back to Oakland and the
Cardinals from St. Louis to Phoenix. These hearings were called to determine the extent of the
antitrust exemption); Richard O'Brien & Kostya Kennedy, Moving Violations,SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Feb. 12, 1996, at 19 (describing the recent decision of the NF*L's Seattle Seahawks to move to Los
Angeles).
82. See generally Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1989).
83. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357; Flood, 407 U.S. at 285.
84. Butterworth v. National League ofProfessional Baseball Clubs, 644 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
85. See id. at 1022. Section 542.28(1) of the Florida Statutes authorizes the attorney general
to issue a civil investigative demand to any person that the attorney general has reason to believe
may be in possession, custody or control of documentary material or information relevant to a civil
antitrust investigation. See id. The specific focus of this civil investigation demand was combination
or conspiracy in restraint of trade in connection with the sale and purchase of the San Francisco
Giants. See id.
86. See Butterworth, 644 So.2d at 1025.
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APPLYING THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION TO MINOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL

The Draft and Major League Baseball Rules

The antitrust exemption is extremely crucial to the workings of
minor league baseball.8 7 The exemption may not extend to the rules and
operations of minor league baseball if the antitrust exemption is limited
to the reserve clause of MLB, and specifically to the reservation and
8
rules governing major league players. This would create a minor
league baseball reserve system which would be considered a separate
system apart from the major league system, thus excluding the minor
leagues from the exemption. 9 However, an argument can be made that
the reserve system in MLB is an integrated whole, composed of both the
major and minor leagues, meaning that the exemption should be applied
equally to both sets of leagues. 90 Players are constantly being called up
from the minors and sent down to the minors during the course of a
baseball season.91 These call-ups and assignments support a similar
interpretation of what the Court originally intended when it first
93
92
established the antitrust exemption for the reserve clause in MLB.
This interpretation is important because if the courts limit the
antitrust exemption to the reserve clause in MLB, the minor leagues
would then be excluded from the exemption, and would therefore remain
94
under the jurisdiction of the federal antitrust laws. As a result, the
87. See ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG BUSINESS OF
OuR NATIONAL PASTIME 180-81 (1992).
88. See Deborah L. Spander, The Impact of Piazza on the Baseball Antitrust Exemption, 2
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 113, 124 (1994).
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 156. The reserve clause refers to those major league rules that govern player
contracts and player movement. See id. Major League Rules 3, 9 and 12 state as follows: (1) require
uniformity of player contracts, (2) confine players to the club that has him under contract, (3)
prevent tampering, (4) allow a major league team which drafts or otherwise acquires a player to
renew his contract for up to five years, and (5) allow a team to assign a player to one of its minor
league affiliates or another club and bind that player to that assignment, among other things. See id.
at 156 n.2.
93. See generallyFederalBaseball,259 U.S. at 200; Flood,407 U.S. at 258; Toolson, 346 U.S.
356.
at
94. See Deborah L. Spander, The Impact ofPiazza on Baseball'sAntitrustExemption, 2 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 113, 124 (1994).
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amateur draft and minor league restraints could be declared illegal
restraints of trade 95 However, since it appears unlikely that this
exemption will be lifted, thereby causing the draft and restraints to
remain as the status-quo, the minor league athlete will have to look
elsewhere for relief.96
B.

Restraints in the Minor League Baseball System

The National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues covers

nineteen professional baseball leagues97 and over 158 teams which are
more commonly known as the minor leagues.98 This league is governed

by two sets of bylaws-the Professional Baseball Agreement ("PBA"),

95. See id. Spander argues that the draft and minor league restraints can violate section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act as illegal restraints of trade in the "market" for player services under the
rule of reason analysis. See id. at 134. In all antitrust cases, a plaintiff has to first allege the market
in which trade is being limited. See id. For sports cases, the applicable market is professional
athletes' services in the appropriate sport. See id. at 156 n.104. Additionally, the rule of reasoned
analysis is applied if there is not a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, meaning the
restraint is not a "blatant refusal to deal." Id. at 156 n.105. The test is whether the restraint is
justified by a legitimate business purpose, and is no more restrictive than necessary. See id. (citing
Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918)); see also Jeffrey A. Rosenthal,
The Amateur Sports Draft: The Best Means to the End?, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1 (1995).
96. At this point, it is extremely important to note the assumption operated under is that the
judicially created antitrust exemption unique to major league baseball will not be overturned as
previously analyzed. Therefore, an analysis of baseball without the exemption is unnecessary.
However, should the antitrust exemption be repealed by the Supreme Court or by Congress, making
the baseball draft and minor league restraints susceptible to federal antitrust law, MLB owners could
argue they are entitled to the nonstatutory labor exemption in professional sports. For a full
discussion of this nonstatutory labor exemption in professional sports see Kieran M. Corcoran, When
Does the Buzzer Sound?: The NonstatutoryLabor Exemption in ProfessionalSports, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1045 (1994). For a discussion of the nonstatutory labor exemption if applied to major league
baseball see Deborah L. Spander, The Impact Piazza on the BaseballAntitrustExemption, 2 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 113, 124-34.
97. See ARTHUR T. JOHNSON, MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 10
(1993). These leagues cover teams in Canada, the United States, Mexico and other summer leagues,
See id.
98. See Deborah L. Spander, The ImpactofPiazzaon Baseball'sAntitrustExemption,2UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 113, 115 (1994).
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an agreement created by MLB and the National Association," and the
00
Professional Baseball Rules.
MLB operates an amateur draft where college and high school
0
players are assigned to one professional baseball team.' ' This draft,
which is composed of sixty rounds,0' was unilaterally imposed by
MLB in 1965.'03 All United States players who are in their final year
of high school, third or fourth year of college, second year of junior
college or have been out of college for at least 120 days are eligible for
the entry draft."°4 Additionally, players in Canada and Mexico can be
those draftees have completed a minimum of eleven
drafted as long as
05
years of school.
Once a team drafts a player, that team has the exclusive right to
06
negotiate and sign that player. If the drafted player refuses to sign
with the team, the only available option for that player to join MLB as
a player is to sit out an entire year and reenter the draft the following
season.0 7 However, the team that drafts this player the next year also
will maintain his exclusive rights for a year, and tampering by other
teams with a player during the negotiation process is expressly prohibited.'08
It is extremely important to note that almost every Major League
Baseball player gets sent to the minor leagues to prove whether he will
09
able to perform at the major league level.' This often entails going
through each and every level of the minor league system, which means

99. A new seven year agreement was negotiated by both parties in 1990. See ANDREW
ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG BUSINESS OF OUR

NATIONAL PASTIME 113 (1992). However, it can be reopened by either side after three years and
terminated after four years. See id. Neither of these have occurred. See id This agreement was
negotiated following the owners defeat in three collusion cases brought by the MLBPA and
therefore, MLB knew it was time to negotiate a new deal with lower subsidies. See id. Analysts
suggest that because of their bitter defeat in the collusion cases, MLB was determined to "beat up
on the minor leagues." Id.
100. See Spander, supra note 98, at 115.
101. See Major League Baseball Rule 4 (reprinted in THE BASEBALL BLUEBOOK 529-35 (1988)).
102. See Spander, supra note 98, at 115.
103. See Spander, supra note 98, at 115.
104. See Major League Baseball Rule 3 (reprinted in THE BASEBALL BLUEBOOK 528 (1988)).
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Deborah L. Spander, The Impact of Piazza on Baseball'sAntitrustExemption, 2 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 113, 116 (1994).
108. See Major League Baseball Rule 3() (reprinted in THE BASEBALL BLUEBOOK 528-34
(1988)).
109. See ARTHUR T. JOHNSON, MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 12
(1993).
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entering rookie ball, then proceeding to Single-A ("A"), Double-A
("AA"), and finally reaching Triple-A ("AAA"). ll° Triple-A is the
closest level to the major leagues, with rookie ball being the furthest.1
Most players do not even make it to the majors, either becoming career
minor leaguers or simply ending their playing days. 12 In fact, only one
minor leaguer in ten ever plays in the majors and only one in fifty stays

in the majors for more than six years."13
The next significant hurdle for a minor league player to overcome
is the presentation and negotiation of his contract. The contract is called
the Minor League Uniform Player Contract ("MLUPC"), and it contains
four parts.'14 Section two consists of twenty-seven paragraphs that

cover a variety of important subject matters. 15 The National Association strictly prohibits any player from amending, altering or negotiating
any part of this section, and as of 1995, no player had been successful
in his attempt to do so. 1 6 The next section of the MLUPC is labeled
"Addendum B" which lists the terms of the contract that are subject to
negotiation, for example, signing bonuses, scholarship plans, 1 7 automatic call-up provisions, ls or any other covenant a player can secure
from a scout acting as a representative for the drafting team." 9 Howev-

110. Seeid.
111. See id.
112. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG
BusInEss OF OUR NATIONAL PATImE

106 (1992).

113. See id.; see also infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
114. See Derek C. Crownover, Minor League Rights ofPublicity areMajor League, 2 SPORTS
L.J. 227, 228 (1995).
115. See id. at 228. The subjects covered in the second paragraph consist of parties to the
contracts, payments schedules, loyalty clauses, dispute resolution, termination, applicable state laws
and licensing waivers. See id. This is all in eight point fine print divided into twenty-seven separate
paragraphs. See id.
116. See id. at 229. But see id. at 242 (arguing that this is an adhesion contract). If a player does
not accept this contract he cannot play baseball and therefore must agree to the terms of the contract
without the opportunity to freely negotiate at arm's length for the provisions. See id. at 242.
117. See id. at 229. Scholarship plans are freely negotiable although once secured, specific
guidelines are attached. See id. The scholarship money can only be used while either playing
professional baseball or within two years of retiring or being released; and can only be used for
tuition, room and board. See id. at 243 n.4
118. See id. Major League rosters expand from twenty-five to forty players every season on
September Ist. See id. Some players are able to secure an "automatic call-up" provision requiring
the club to put the player on that expanded forty man roster. See id at 243 n.3.
119. See id.Such provisions include performance and promotion bonuses; donations made to
charities made by the club on behalf of the player, plane fare for parents to visit during spring
training or for games during the season. See id.It is important to note that the highest percentage
of players are not able to secure these benefits, with mostly the high picks securing these clauses.
See id. at 243 n.5.
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er, during the initial contract negotiation, a player is forbidden from
negotiating any part of his contract except for the signing bonus and an
education stipend during his first seven seasons. 21 Additionally, no
individual or team performance bonus clauses are allowed. 2 '
"Addendum C" to the contract contains the salary amounts per year
for the length of the player's contract."z Most minor league contracts
are for one year in duration. 23 Once the initial contract is signed, a
drafted player is forced to grant his drafting team six successive and
annual renewal options. 24 In actuality, not withstanding a few minor
exceptions,"z the team retains the exclusive rights to the drafted player
for the first seven seasons of his minor league career. 26 Moreover, the
pay scale, which is established by the National Association and followed
by all minor league clubs,'27 is fixed at the signing of the initial
years. 121
contract for the duration of the contract including the option
After the initial MLUPC is signed, negotiation becomes moot because the
player's salary is based upon "Addendum C" which contains the pay
scale according to the level of assignment. 29

120. See Deborah L. Spander, The Impact ofPiazza on Baseball'sAntitrust Exemption, 2 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 113, 116. But see supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.; see also infra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
126. See Deborah L. Spander, The Impact ofPiazza on Baseball'sAntitrustExemption, 2 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 113, 116.
127. See id.
128. See Derek C. Crownover, Minor League Rights of Publicity areMajor League, 2 SPORTS
L.J. 227, 229 (1995).
129. See id. The average monthly salary of the minor league players as of 1990 were as follows:
Rookie, $868; A, $850-950; AA, $1,000-1200; AAA, $1250-1500. See Deborah L. Spander, The
Impact of Piazza on Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 2 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 113, 116 (1994); see
also ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG BUSINESS
OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 116 (1992) (stating that as of 1990, the following pay scale existed:
Rookie, $868; A-$1074, AA- $1763; AAA, $5,424. The averages at the Triple-A level are distorted
higher because of the high salaries of a few dozen top draft picks and former major leaguers. The
median salary in Triple-A in 1990 was likely below $2,000/month). Additionally, the low level A
ball salary is lower than the $1074, approximately the same as Rookie ball. See Derek C.
Crownover, Minor League Rights ofPublicity are Major League, 2 SPORTS L.J. 227, 229 (1995).
Minor league players receive salaries for 4.5 months, except players in the rookie league who play
for 2.5 months. See ANDREW ZIMALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE
BIG BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 115, 116 (1992).
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Upon signing the MLUPC, a player also relinquishes most, if not all
of his privacy and marketing rights.13 Unfortunately, many minor
league players sign their contracts without full knowledge of the
ramifications of the agreement, doing so without the aid or advice of
counsel or an agent.'
In effect, the contract requires a player to
relinquish all rights to make money from trading cards, photographs,
movies, radio, television, commercials and sponsorships without the
32
express written consent of the player's club.
In addition to all of these restrictions, the minor leagues also impose
binding arbitration on all salary disputes. 33 In and of itself, arbitration
is a viable form of alternative dispute settlement, however, the arbitration
proceedings for minor league players can only be heard by the President
of the National Association, the Executive Committee of the National
Association and the Commissioner of Baseball. 34 An outside, impartial
arbitrator is not allowed, 135 and thus, the good faith intention of
arbitration as a way to resolve disputes by avoiding costs and time of
litigation is lost.'36
There are only two mechanisms that provide the minor league player
with any kind of autonomy. First, Rule 10-e restricts the ability of MLB
clubs to freely call-up players from the minor leagues. 37 During his
first three seasons, a minor league player can be called up without having
to clear waivers. 38 However, after three seasons of freely optioning the
player back and forth from the minors to the majors, a team must expose
the player to the waiver wire where another team has the ability to claim
that player's rights before the player is sent down to the minor
leagues. 39 Also, a player cannot be optioned without his permission
following his fifth season."

130. See id. at 238. This is based on the language of Paragraph XXIV entitled "Pictures of
Player" as contained in the MLUPC. See id.

131. See id.
132. See id. This conclusion was based on a case study from law in New York. See id
133. See National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, Inc., National Association
Agreemen4 in THE BASEBALL BLUEBOOK 410-11 (John Montague & Darlene Rice eds., 1995).

134.
135.
136.
137.
(1988)).
138.
139.
140.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See Major League Baseball Rule 10 (reprinted in THE BASEBALL BLUEBOOK 529-35
See id.
See i.
See id.
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Another rule that grants a player limited freedom is Rule 5.141
This Rule pertains to the winter draft which allows players who have
been in the minors for four or more seasons to be drafted by another
team if that player is not placed on his major league team's forty-man
roster.12 The actual major league roster consists of twenty-five players,
but each team is allowed to additionally protect a maximum of fifteen
players to arrive at a forty man roster.43 Essentially, there is an active
major league roster of twenty-five players plus fifteen optioned
players.'" Although this appears to give a player some freedom, in
reality it does not because the new drafting team can force the player to
fulfill the remaining option years from the original MLUPC. 14' As a
result, a Rule 5 player is simply uprooted from his original team during
the life of his seven year deal. To retain a Rule 5 player, the new team
must keep him on the active twenty-five man roster for the entire
subsequent season. 146 If the player is not on this twenty-five man
roster, he must be offered back to his original team at half the Rule 5
drafting price. 4 7
This process only scratches the surface of the arduous journey
through the minor league system. Often a player may remain in the
minors for years simply waiting for his position to open up at the major
league level. 148 In reality, only one minor leaguer out of ten ever makes
it to the "big leagues" and out of that number, only one in fifty lasts for
more than six years. 149 Once in the major leagues, a player then has to
wait an additional six years before becoming a free agent."O
Minor league players can be released unconditionally and without
any additional salary rights or severance pay.'' These players receive

141. See Major League Baseball Rule 5 (reprinted in THE BASEBALL BLUEBOOK 536 (1988)).
142. See id.; see also supra note 112 and accompanying text.
143. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG
BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 106 (1992).
144. See id.
145. See Deborah L. Spander, The Impact ofPiazza on Baseball'sAntitrustExemption,2 UCLA
ENT. L. REv. 113, 117 (1994).
146. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 143, at 106.
147. See ZMIBALIST, supra note 143, at 106.
148. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 143, at 106. Essentially, this means if a minor league player
only plays second base, and the major league club has a young all-star second baseman, the minor
league prospect will have to wait his turn in the minors. See ZIMBALIST, supra 143, at 106.
149. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 143, at 106; see also J. MARKMAN & P. TEPLrrZ, BASEBALL
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 22-23 (1981).
150. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 143, at 106.
151. See National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, Inc., The NationalAssociation
Agreement, § 23.02 in THE BASEBALL BLUEBOOK (John Montague & Darlene Rice eds., 1995)
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no benefits except a "modest health insurance program." 112 Based on
the salary structure and lack of incentives and benefits, players must
scrape to survive.'53 Perhaps Whitey Herzog" described the minor
leagues the best when he said
[h]e'll [the minor league baseball player] get a crappy little apartment
with a couple of other guys, eat nothing but greasy hamburgers and
fries, and try to have a good time. A lot of them will drink too much,
and I have to believe that's where a lot of drug problems get started.

155

It is clear that the true compensation while playing in the minors is the
future possibility of becoming a major leaguer, although, relative to the
circumstance, conditions do improve as you move up the "baseball
56
ladder."
Minor league baseball clubs are a tremendous asset to their major
league partners. The minor leagues serve as a place for player development; a forum where a genuine interest can develop between a fan and
a prospect, a franchise, and baseball in general; a medium to geographically diversify baseball's fan base; a pool to fill inevitable holes that
develop on the major league roster during the course of a season due to
injury or slumping players; a rehabilitation ground for major league
(stating that the relationship between a club and a player created by contract may be terminated by
the club before the expiration of the specified term by notice of writing of unconditional release
tendered the player by the club. Liability for such salary to such player shall not extend beyond the
date on which such notice is given).
152. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG
BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 107 (1992).
153. New York agent and lawyer Jay Goldberg was quoted as saying during the 1995-1996
season strike where owners were asking minor league players to report early, "[B]ut it's an economic
hardship for most of my guys [clients who were minor league baseball players] to give up three
weeks of paying work. One of my players is working as a substitute teacher by day and a pizza
deliverer by night just to make ends meet." Lee Lowenfish, Fielder'sNonchoice: Minor Leaguers
Must Choose: Side With Owners Who Exploit Them? Or a Union That Snubs Them?, VILLAGE
VOICE, Feb. 21, 1995, at 122. Another example is shortstop Tim Naehering. He earned $1,400 a
month and was forced to share a two bedroom apartment with four other teammates. See ANDREW
ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG BUSINESS OF OUR
NATIONAL PASTIME 107 (1992). One of the five actually slept on the couch. See id. During the offseasons, Naehering would return to his parents' home and deliver pizza in the winter and work in
a sporting goods store. See id.
154. Former player, manager and executive in major league baseball. See Gerry Fraley, All-Star
State; RejuvenatedAL shows it has best swat team, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 11, 1995, at C1.
155. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG
BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 105 (1992).

156. See Stephen J. Spurr & William Barber, The Effect ofPerformanceon a Worker's Career:
Evidence From Minor League Baseball,47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 692, 695 (1994).
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baseball players recovering from injury; and lastly, the minor leagues
effectively comer the market on all baseball playing talent so as to make
7
it a near impossibility for rival leagues to form."
During negotiations for the 1990 Professional Baseball Agreement,
MLB argued that the minor leagues were an extremely expensive
investment.15 Using its player development budget as its arsenal, MLB
claimed that it spent $169,679,000 in 1990 and $187,231,000 in 1991 on
the minor leagues alone. 9 It is crucial to realize that this figure
included the scouting, signing and administrative expenses, which totaled
over $11.23 million."6 Therefore, the actual expenditures on a Triple-A
team was $810,000, on a Double-A team $367,923 and on a Single-A
team $229,549.161 In spite of the "relatively low cost" of maintaining
these minor league teams and an increase in attendance, 62 MLB
walked away from the 1990 negotiating session with the National
Association gaining concessions, money, 63 and increased power over
the minor leagues.

157. See ZIMBALIST, supranote 152, at 105-21; see also Gary Roberts, On the Scope and Effect
of Baseball'sAntitrust Exclusion, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 321, 326 n.9 (1994).
158. See ZImBAUST, supra note 152, at 105-121.
159. See Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball Economics and Antitrust Immunity, 4 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 287, 304 (1994).
160. See id.
161. See id.; see also Major League Baseball, Report ofIndependent Members of the Economic
Study Committee on Baseball, App. B, at 3-9 (Dec. 3, 1992). These numbers are not gross and therefore do not contain revenue sharing payments made from the minor league clubs to their major
league affiliates. See Zimbalist, supra note 159, at 304.
162. Baseball, Attendance Prize, SPORTING NEWS, Aug. 15, 1994, at 14.
163. See Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball Economics and Antitrust Immunity, 4 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 287, 304 (1994). The key elements of the 1990 agreement were as follows: (1) For the
years 1991-1994, the National Association will pay respectively, $750,000, $1.5 million, $1.75
million and $2 million. See id.; (2) A joint licensing agreement was created between the two parties
whereby the National Association would receive at least $2.8 million per year for the royalties of
minor league trading cards. See id.; (3) Minor league baseball clubs would assume a greater
percentage of the costs of travel expenses. See id.; (4) Major league clubs will pay all salaries and
meal money for players and umpires, and buy all equipment. See id. ; (5) The previous $35.00
transaction fee paid to the minors was eliminated. See id. ; (6) The minor leagues would no longer
receive any of the television fees which for AAA, AA and A, respectively per team used to be
$25,000, $16,000, $11,000. See id. For 1992, according to the then President of the National
Association, minor league teams spent $13.5 million on team expenses and sent $1.9 million from
ticket sales. See id. at 304-05 n.85. Additionally, the licensing agreement produced between $250,000
and $500,000 for 1992. See id. at 304-05 n.85.
164. See ARTHUR T. JOHNSON, MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 30
(1993) (stating the increased powers of the Commissioner of MLB over the minor leagues). They
include the authority to: intervene in the business of the National Association if in the "best interests
of baseball"; void or approve all sales or transfers of minor league franchises; request audited
financial statements; require eighteen months notice from a minor league if that league intends to
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These statistics indicate that MLB is getting a good deal on their
clubs. Waste and inefficiency can be attributed to scouting and administration, but not to the teams themselves.1 65 In actuality, the value of the
minor league franchises range from hundreds of thousands of dollars for
A-level teams to several million dollars for AA and AAA- level
teams.'66 Additionally, expansion franchise fees allocated in the 1990
deal for AAA, AA and A, cost; $5 million, $3 million and 1.3 million

respectively.

67

It is also apparent that the minor league clubs them-

selves are able a turn a profit. 61 In spite of this, the minor league
player, while contributing to the profits, is not being rewarded proportionally, or even modestly, for his efforts.
C.

The Antitrust Exemption and the Reserve Clause
in Major League Baseball

Acting under the present state of the law, baseball rules restricting
69
the player market are protected under the antitrust exemption.
However, the collective bargaining efforts of the MBPA have virtually
made these rules and reserve clauses non-existent.170 Minor league

expand; approval of such expansion and require approval of any grant of home territory to a club.
See id.
165. See Zimbalist, supra, note 163, at 305.
166. See ARTHUR T. JOHNSON, MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPM ENT 18
(1993). For example: Buffalo's franchise was worth $8 million in 1990, the A level South Bend
White Sox were bought for $4 million, AAA-Omaha, $5 million; AA-Williamsport, $3 million and
AAA-Oklahoma City, $4.5 million. See i. All of these generated unbelievable profits. See id.
167. See i.
168. See id. at 20-25.
169. See Gary Roberts, On the Scope ofBaseball'sAntitrustExemption, 4 SEToN HALL J. SPORT
L. 321, 325 (1994).
170. See id. The key event triggering the grant of free agency in the 1976 Basic Agreement
between MLB and the MLBPA was the Messersmith arbitration decision. See id. In that case, two
players had challenged the owners use of the reserve clause. Twelve Clubs Comprising the National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Twelve Clubs Comprising American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, Los Angeles and Montreal Clubs and Major League Baseball Players
Association, 66 LA 101 (1976) (Seitz, Arb.). Specifically, that the owners could not simply keep
adding a one year option year to the contract of a player, without that player's signature, following
the completion of the life of the contract. See i. Arbitrator Seitz found for the players, declaring
them free agents once their contracts expired. See i. Rules regarding free agency have been
incorporated into the Major League Agreement between players, owners and leagues. See Shant H.
Chalian, Fourth and Goal:Player Restraintsin ProfessionalSports,A Look Back and a LookAhead,
67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 593, 608 (1989) (citing the BASIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AMERICAN
LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS AND THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL

BASEBALL CLUBS AND MAJOR LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION art. XX, § B (1990), reprinted in
LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, at 5-63 (Gary Uberstine ed., 1990)). Players whose
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players are not as fortunate as their major league counterparts because
they do not have a union which attempts to secure the rights and
freedoms of its players. 7 '
To their credit, many lower courts have narrowed the scope of the
antitrust exclusion by holding that contracts between entities of
baseball" and third parties will not be protected under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.' However, this exception does not include those
74
situations where the third party is a minor league baseball entity.
Protected rules and clauses allow MLB to structure the minor
leagues as it wishes, without a fear of antitrust litigation. 175 This
exclusion grants MLB the right to control players, and as a result, MLB
keeps a tight reign on minor league baseball.' 7 6 This is why the
exclusion makes its largest impact in minor league baseball. 177 When
a player signs his initial MLUPC, that contract, and subsequently that
player, is owned and controlled by the major league franchise. 17 The

contracts have expired and performed six years of major league service are eligible to become free
agents. See id. Players who have not completed the six years of major league service can only
negotiate with their original clubs. See id. at 608-09. If the two sides cannot agree on a salary, the
matter is submitted to an impartial arbitrator where the result is binding. See id. Additionally, some
players who have signed free agent contracts cannot become free agents again until another five
years of major league service have passed. See id. This is all in addition to the time spent in the
minor leagues. See id. at 609 n.100.
171. See ANDREw ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG

BusINEss OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 178-80 (1992).
172. See Gary Roberts, On the Scope and Effect of Baseball'sAntitrust Exemption, 4 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 321, 325 (1994). Baseball entities, according to Roberts, include, but are not
limited to: teams, leagues and players associations. See id.
173. See id. See, eg., Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139 (3rd Cir. 1981)
(holding related to memorabilia merchandiser contracts with individual minor and major leaguers
subject to the Sherman Act); Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp.
263 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (finding the cancellation of a contract between owner and plaintiff company
not central enough to baseball to fall under exclusion); Twin City Sportsservice, Inc., v. Charles 0.
Finley & Co., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (finding a contract between concessionaire
and baseball club subject to Sherman Act); Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust and Sports: Must Competition
on the Field Displace Competition in the Marketplace, 60 TENN. L. REV. 263, 264 n.16 (1993).
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states, in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in the restraint of trade of commerce among the several
states... is declared to be illegal." See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1992).
174. See Roberts, supra note 172. See, e.g., Portland Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101 (9th
Cir. 1974).
175. See Roberts, supra note 172.
176. See Roberts, supra note 172 at 326 n.9.
177. See Michael H. Juarez, Baseball'sAntitrust Exemption, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
737, 745 (1995).
178. See id. at 745.
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existence of the reserve clause in these contracts allows control over the
player for six years.17 9
Unlike most people who work, a minor league athlete is prevented
from marketing his skills after signing this contract."' He is at the
mercy of the major league franchise. If his position is filled at the major
league level, he must wait patiently for a roster spot to open or hope to
be traded to another organization.'8 1 There is no leverage or bargaining
power that the minor league athlete can draw upon. He may enter the
minors after graduating high school at the age of eighteen or after
graduating college at the age of twenty-two."~ With the restraints
placed upon him, he may be anywhere from twenty-four to twenty-eight
years old by the time he has the opportunity to freely market his
skills.'83 Beginning a major league career at the age of twenty-eight is
not ideal, that is, if he makes it at all. During his quest, he must endure
the long bus rides throughout minor league baseball towns, continually
dine at inexpensive restaurants and live in less than accommodating
conditions." This is the life of the minor league player while the
8 5 in
major league franchises continue to make money hand over fist
spite of their claims that they are losing money on the minor league
systems. 6 The only clear remedy to provide equity to the minor

179. See id. at 746.
180. See id. at 745-46; see also ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING
LOOK INSIDE THE BIG BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 105-21, 180-81 (1992); Gary Roberts,
On the Scope and Effect ofBaseball's Antitrust Exemption, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 321, 326

(1994).
181. See Michael H. Juarez, Baseball'sAntitrust Exemption, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
at 745-46.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG
BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 105-21 (1992); ARTHUR T. JOHNSON, MINOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 10 (1993).
185. An additional aspect to major league ownership is that when a franchise is purchased,
whether expansion or sale, owners may take depreciation deductions on their taxes for their acquired
player contracts, typically over a period of five years. See Stephen A. Zom, "Couldna Done It
Without the Players:"Depreciation of ProfessionalSports Player Contracts Under the Internal
Revenue Code, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 337 (1994). Simultaneously, owners may also deduct the
cost of maintaining a scouting system and paying minor league players and coaches, all under I.R.C.
§ 162. See id. Evidence shows that the cost to develop a player through a farm system was
approximately $350,000, or $8.7 million for the twenty-five player major league roster. See id. All
of that cost is currently deductible allowing for a double deduction in terms of depreciation. See id.
186. See ANDREW ZmIBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG
BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 178-80; see also ARTHUR T. JOHNSON, MINOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 10 (1993).
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league players under the present legal status of major league baseball is
to unionize.
IV.

A.

UNIONIZING MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

Benefits of the Collective BargainingProcess

It is evident that life in the minor leagues leaves much to be desired.
Although the benefits of union representation are numerous, 187 the
question remains if selecting an exclusive bargaining representative is
viable, and if it is, will it change the present system. The following
section details the general concepts and requirements for negotiating a
collective bargaining agreement.
To begin a collective bargaining relationship, an employer must
first recognize the union, or other selected representative, as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees.18 8 This can occur
in one of two ways. Once a union conveys to an employer that a
majority of the employees support it as the exclusive bargaining
representative, the employer can in turn "voluntarily" recognize the
union." 9 "Majority status" may be established by obtaining signed
authorization cards from the employees within the unit."' If the
employer chooses not to voluntarily recognize the union19' the union
can opt to petition the National Labor Relations Board ('NLRB") 9 z for

187. See generally JAMES P. BEGIN & EDWIN F. BEAL, THE PRACTICE OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING (7th ed. 1985) (detailing the history of the collective bargaining process since its birth
within the United States over two centuries ago).
188. See id.at 156.
189. See id. at 159-60.
190. Stephen L. Ukeiley, No Salary,No Union, No Collective Bargaining:ScholarshipAthletes
Are an Employer's Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 188, 193 (1996).
191. If an employer recognizes a union based on the majority of authorization cards, and the
union turns out to not have a majority, the employer and the union have just committed an unfair
labor practice under section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act. See, e.g., ILGWU v. NLRB
(Bemhard-Altmann Texan Corp.), 366 U.S. 731 (1961). The burden is on the employer to verify the
union's majority status, therefore it is understandable for the employer to seek a definite answer
through an NLRB election. See id. at 739.
192. See Ukeiley, supra note 190, at 193. The National Labor Relations Board is the body that
implements the National Labor Relations Act. See Ukeiley, supra note 190, at 193. The NLRB "'is
empowered to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice."' Silverman v. Major
League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 246, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 160(a)). The NLRB investigates charges of unfair labor practices with the assistance of
Regional Offices, and if a charge is found to be meritorious, a complaint can be issued. See
Silvennan, 880 F. Supp. at 253. An Administrative Law Judge hears the complaint and the NLRB
is allowed to review the disposition and hold its own hearings if it wishes. See id.
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election guaranteed under the National Labor Relations Act
a certification
193

(,NLRA,).

After winning the election by receiving a majority of the votes of
the employees within the bargaining unit, a union may be certified by the
NLRB. Both the employer and the union are obligated to begin goodfaith negotiating in the hopes of arriving at a collective bargaining
agreement."9 A union should attempt to accomplish three objectives
during this process: (1) secure and improve the employee's standard of
living; (2) guarantee individual security against fluctuating markets; and
(3) ensure employee participation in work and union activities. 9 5 The
employee participation in establishing workultimate goal is to 19increase
6
related conditions.
A common misconception is that the parties have to bargain over
every issue raised.'9 7 According to section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, the
only legal duty is for parties to bargain in good faith over mandatory
subjects.' 98 These issues include, but are not limited to wages, hours
and working conditions.'99 The distinction between mandatory and

193. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). The National Labor Relations Act was enacted by
Congress in order to protect employees from employer attempts to disrupt union organization and
the collective bargaining process. See id. § 151. The law was passed to eliminate obstructions to the
free flow of commerce when it has occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining through protection of "workers freedom of association, self organization, and designation
of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection." See id.§ 151.
194. See JAMES P. BEGIN & EDwIN F. BEAL, THE PRACTICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 203
(7th ed. 1985).
195. See Ukeiley, supra note 190, at 194.
196. See Ukeiley, supra note 190, at 194. The MLBPA's primary thrust in 1966 was the goal
of improved job-related rights for its members. See WALTER T. CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SPORTS LAW 438 (1990).
197. See Stephen L. Ukeiley, No Salary, No Union, No Collective Bargaining: Scholarship
Athletes Are an Employer's Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L, 188, 194 (1996).
198. See JAMES P. BEGIN & EDWIN F. BEAL, THE PRACTICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 203
(7th ed. 1985). If a topic is considered permissive, then an employer can unilaterally implement this
subject without negotiating. See U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1994); see also WALTER T. CHAMPION,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW 440 (1990). In professional sports, the subject matter of collective
bargaining extends to all topics that relate to the terms and conditions of employment of ballplayers.
See id. During the MLBPA negotiations with MLB, the reserve clause was considered to be a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. See id. Although the collective bargaining agreement
itself did not solve the reserve clause problem, the arbitration system, allowing for an impartial
arbitrator, created a forum where the reserve clause was dismantled. See id.
199. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994); see also Stephen L. Ukeiley, No Salary, No Union, No
Collective Bargaining:ScholarshipAthlete's Are an Employer's Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALL
J. SPORT L. 188, 194 (1996) (noting that section 9(a) of the NLRA requires the employee's
representatives to collectively bargain over wages, hours and working conditions for all of the
employees within the unit). Mandatory subjects of collective bargaining are covered under section
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permissive subjects 200 of bargaining is crucial in labor disputes, because
it determines to what extent one party may compel the other to bargain
over a given proposal.20 t Mandatory subjects require the parties to
in good faith, while permissive subjects do not require the same
bargain 202
burden.
Free agency and the reserve system have been determined to be
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining in major league baseball.20 3
This is so because the more restrictive the reserve system, the greater the
revenue share to the club, while the greater the role for free agency, the
greater the player's share.2 4 The reserve system gives a particular club
the right to the player's services and allows the player limited freedom
to seek employment with another club. 205 In enforcing a complete
reserve system, MLB "was exercising monopoly power-a buyer's
monopoly. ' 2 6 Therefore, MLB would be forced to bargain in good
faith over free agency and the reserve system in minor league baseball.
This fact does not exist in minor league baseball today, nor will it unless
a union organizes the minor league baseball players and utilizes the
power of the NLRA to effectuate employee rights.
Moreover, salary arbitration in MLB that was detailed in the 1990
collective bargaining agreement ("Basic Agreement") has been determined to be a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.2 7 Salary
arbitration under the Basic Agreement is a method by which players who
are not eligible for free agency but have between three and six years of

8(d) of the NLRA stating "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.' NLRB
v. Wooster Div. of Borg Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). Permissive subjects are all other
matters. See id.
200. See Silverman, 880 F. Supp. at 253. The court noted the fact that potential subjects of
bargaining are divided into two areas-permissive and mandatory. See id.; see also Wooster, 356
U.S. at 349.
201. See Silverman, 880 F. Supp. at 253.
202. See id
203. See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 67 F.3d 1054, 1059
(2d Cir. 1995) (holding that unfair labor practices committed by the owners against the players by
unilaterally eliminating subjects were mandatory).
204. See id. at 1061.

205. See id.
206. Id. The Second Circuit in Silverman noted that this monopoly power was reduced by the
1976 elimination of free agency through the arbitration decision Messersmith. See id.; see also
National & Am. League Prof'l Baseball Clubs v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 66 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 101 (1976). Consequently, the MLBPA used this decision to bargain free agency into
a new collective bargaining agreement. See id.
207. See Silverman, 67 F.3d at 1062.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol14/iss1/6

28

Szuchman: Step Up to the Bargaining Table: A Call for the Unionization of M
Unionizationof MinorLeague Baseball

1996]

major league service, can set salaries." 8 Both owners and players
submit salary figures to an agreed upon arbitrator, who is then bound to
pick one of these salaries at the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding.2" Interest arbitration, defined as "a method by which an employer
and union reach new agreements by sending disputed issues to an
arbitrator rather than settling them through the collective bargaining
process and economic force,"21 is a permissive subject of collective
bargaining."' The Second Circuit held that salary arbitration under the
Basic Agreement is not interest arbitration and therefore is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining.2" 2 As a result of this determination,
minor league baseball players would also have the opportunity to bargain
over a new arbitration procedure with the employers. The result of this
bargaining process would most certainly create a more equitable
arbitration system than the one that presently exists.2 13
The current status of minor league baseball players can be
characterized as a group of workers with no voice. A union, through the
collective bargaining process, can give them the voice they need to "level
the playing field." Wages could increase, job security could improve and
pension, health and insurance benefits could become a reality. It is
obvious the minor league players cannot accomplish these goals on their
own-the collective bargaining process is designed to facilitate this
process.
B.

The Legality of Unionizing Minor League Baseball

In order for minor league athletes to designate a collective
bargaining representative, it must be shown that there is an employment
relationship between Major League Baseball and its minor league
athletes.2" 4 Additionally, the minor league athlete must fit within the

208. See id. Criteria in determining the salary include player's performance from the preceding
year, physical or mental defects, salaries of comparable players, career contribution, and the
performance of the team on the field and amount of fan attendance. See id.

209. See id.;
see also Major League Baseball Basic Agreement, art. VI(F) (1990).
210. Silverman, 67 F.3d at 1061; see also New York Typographical Union No. 6 v. Printers
League, 919 F.2d 3, n.2 (2d Cir. 1990).
211. See Silverman, 67 F.3d at 1061.
212. See id.
213. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
214. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1994) provides:
The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or
indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government
corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof,
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statutory definition of "employee" as defined by section 2(3) of the
215 The NLRA covers only "private"
National Labor Relations Act.
employees and employers, which includes MLB and minor league
clubs.2 16 The goal of the NLRA is to improve labor relations by
granting specific sets of rights to employers and employees. 217 Most
importantly, the NLRA grants employees the right to self organization,
to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively and to
engage in concerted activity.218 As a result, minor league baseball
players will be allowed to select an exclusive bargaining representative,
if they so choose do so, 219 that will negotiate the terms and working
conditions of employment as well as look for opportunities to increase
health and welfare benefits."
As a prerequisite to conducting a representation election, the NLRB
must determine which group of jobs and workers shall serve as the
election constituency." This group of jobs becomes known as the

or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act... or any labor organization (other than
when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such
labor organization.
Id.
215. Id. § 152(3). An employee is defined as:
[A]ny employee, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual
employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person
at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual
having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed by an
employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended form time to time, or by any
person who is not an employer as herein defined.
Id.
216. See supra note 214.
217. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450, 453 (1995).
218. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
219. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). The 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments provide employees defined within the Act the option of refraining from implementing
their section 7 employee rights. See id.
220. Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act requires the employees' representatives
to collectively bargain over wages, hours and other working conditions for all of the employees
within the bargaining unit. In pertinent part, this section of the NLRA reads:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (19°4).
221. See ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 279 (1 lth ed. 1991).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol14/iss1/6

30

Szuchman: Step Up to the Bargaining Table: A Call for the Unionization of M
19961

Unionization ofMinor League Baseball

appropriate bargaining unit and the workers so employed in those jobs
can vote whether to elect the union.2n The NLRB bases its determinations upon what is known as the community of interest standard. 3
Based on this criteria, it is possible for several units to join as one unit
and be deemed the appropriate bargaining unit. 4 However, smaller
units are easier to organize and tend to give the individual employee
greater attention. 5 Larger units encompass a more diverse group of
employees, often differing in skill, attitude and interest.226 Additionally,
larger units tend to wield greater power because of the threat of a
massive work-stoppage in the event of a bargaining disputeY 7
The minor leagues are a vast and geographically diverse system, and
as such determining an appropriate bargaining unit may prove to be
difficult. The choices would be team, league or sport. 228 In MLB, the
entire sport is the bargaining unit.2 29 The NLRB agreed that the larger
unit was more suited to allow the players the greatest benefits of the
NLRA. 2 0 There is no reason why this same logic should not transfer
to the minor leagues. In fact, this would allow the minor league players
to garner power for what would loom to be a difficult negotiation and
therefore truly take advantage of the power of the NLRA. However, the
selection of an appropriate bargaining unit does not have to be made
until after the minor leaguers are recognized as employees, therefore, the
matter will be left for future analysis.231

222. See id.
223. See id. at 283. In determining if employees have a "community of interest," the NLRB
looks at the following factors: (1)similarity in the scale and method of determining salaries; (2)
similarity in hours of work, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment; (3) similarity
in the type of work performed; (4) similarity in the skills, training and qualifications of employees;
(5) frequency of contact between employees; (6) geographic proximity; (7) continuity of production
processes; (8) common supervision and determination of labor-relations policy; (9) history of
collective bargaining; (10) desires of affected employees; (11) extent of union organization. See id.
See generally NLRB v. Purnell's Pride, Inc., 609 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980).
224. See ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 279 (1 lth ed. 1991).

225. See id. at 281.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. WALTER T. CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW 439 (1990).
229. See id.

230. See id.
231. See Stephen L. Ukeiley, No Salary, No Union, No Collective Bargaining: Scholarship

Athletes Are an Employer's Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 167, 177 (1996). There
are two different types of bargaining units; single plant and multiemployer units. See iL
Multiemployer bargaining units occur where employers within a single industry organize and act as
one entity representing all companies. See id. Perfect examples of these multiemployer units are
professional sports leagues. See id. A presumption is that there is a single unit unless it is shown
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The term "employee" is broadly construed and can be understood
to include virtually any person within the meaning of that term as it is
commonly used. 2 Minor league baseball players are not specifically
excluded under section 2(3) of the NLRA as are other groups who are
traditionally thought of as fitting the layman's definition of an employee.233 The groups of workers excluded under this section are agricultural workers, domestics, independent contractors, supervisors, and
employees covered by the Railway Labor Act.234 Courts have also had
occasion to apply and interpret the definition of "employee" to persons
and employment situations not explicitly included by the NLRA. 35 It
is evident that minor league baseball players are not on the exclusionary
list, and no court has excluded them from the definition of "employee." 236
Moreover, there was no challenge as to the jurisdiction of the NLRA

employees agree to the multiemployer unit. See id. at 15 n.50. Therefore, minor league athletes could
form together as one bargaining unit of each level (AAA, AA, etc.) or the entire minor leagues could
form one unit. See id.
232. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S.Ct. 450, 453 (1995). The Court noted
the ordinary dictionary definition of "employee" is consistent with the phrasing of the NLRA. See
id.at 453. This definition includes "any person who works for another in return for financial or other
compensation.' lad(quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIONARY 604 (3d ed. 1992)). The court also
adopted the following definition "an employee is a 'person in the service of another under any
contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, where the employer has the power of right to
control and direct the employee in the material details of how the work is to be performed."' Town
& Country, 116 S.Ct. at 453-54 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 525 (6th ed. 1990)).
233. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 STAT. 449 (1935) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-16'9 (1994)). The NLRA defines the term "employee" as follows:
The term employee shall include any employee, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise,
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but
shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic
service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed as a supervisor,
or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as
amended from time to time, or by any person who is not an employer as herein defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
234. See id.
235. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984) (stating that the Act covers
undocumented aliens); see also NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131-32 (1994)
(holding that independent newsboys are "employees"); NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec.
Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 189-90 (1981) (noting that some confidential employees are
considered employees under the NLRA); Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157, 166 (1971) (stating that retired persons are not "employees" under the NLRA); Packard Motor
Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 488-90 (1947) (stating that company foremen are "employees");
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1941) (holding that job applicants are
"employees"). But see 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994) (amending the NLRA to overrule Hearst and
Packardby explicitly excluding independent contractors and supervisory employees).
236. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
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over minor league hockey players.2 37 Due to the similarities in the
employment circumstances of minor league hockey and baseball players,
the minor league baseball player is an employee under the NLRA.
Furthermore, due to the fact that professional baseball, hockey, and
football players are all unionized, there are clear precedents to cite so
that the status of a minor league athlete should not be questioned.23
The fact that MLB itself is unionized is extremely important.
Section 1 of the NLRA applies to all employers that affect commerce,
although the NLRB can decline to assert jurisdiction over a labor dispute
if its effect on commerce is minimal.239 Due to the holding in Federal
Baseball,the NLRB had difficulties bringing the concepts of professional
sports and athletes under the purview of the NLRA.2' However, in a
response to a 1969 petition filed by the association of National League
Umpires, the NLRB decided to assert jurisdiction over baseball as an
industry that affects commerce. 241 The NLRB noted that the NLRA was
created to foster collective bargaining relationships which are not likely
to occur in an employer dominated system such as MLB.242 The NLRB
also noted that there are many different types of employees in professional baseball besides umpires and players.243 These include everyone
from the stadium janitors to the team ticket sellers.2 " The NLRB ruled
that employers should not be able to maintain such complete control over
their employees.245
It can be concluded from this language that the NLRB found MLB
players as well as a whole host of other workers associated with a MLB
club to be employees under the NLRA. The minor leaguer is no different
from any of these employees and therefore should be considered an
employee under the NLRA. Although the antitrust exemption continued
in MLB, the Flood opinion, which declared baseball's involvement in

237. See Telephone Interview with Richard Evans, Director of Legal & Business Affairs,
Professional Hockey Players Association (Feb. 16, 1996).

238. See id.
239. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2(6), 2(7), 14(c)l, 151-166.
240. See Robert A. McCormick, Baseball'sThird Strike: The Triumph of Collective Bargaining
in ProfessionalBaseball, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1152 (1982).

241. See American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190, 191-92 (1969).
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.The actual list included; "players, clubhouse attendants, bat boys, watchmen, scouts,
ticket sellers, ushers, gatemen, trainers, office clericals, batting practice pitchers, stilemen, publicity,

and advertising men, groundskeepers and maintenance men." Id.; see WALTER T. JOHNSON,
FuNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAw 435-36 (1990).
245. See WALTER T. JOHNSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW 436 (1990).
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interstate commerce, concurred with the Board's earlier determination
246
and thus subjected MLB to NLRA coverage.
C.

The Employer of the Minor League Player

Major League Baseball might argue that the individual minor league
franchise owners are the employers of each minor league player.
However, this is an invalid assertion. As is the case with any employment analysis, it is critical to examine who has the authority and control
over these players. As previously stated, according to the National
Association Agreement, the major league baseball club that signs the
247
draftee to a minor league contract pays that player. The minor league
team the player actually plays on does not pay any portion of his
salary.24 These minor league baseball players work for money-this
is not simply a game played for fun anymore. The goal is to reach the
major leagues and to receive a tremendous salary increase. Certainly, the
pursuit and love of the game is part of it, but it is a business and one
that players play to make money.
In addition, the MLB club retains almost exclusive right of control
over players in terms of player movement within the franchise as well as
outside the franchise.249 Terminating a players contract also rests in the
2 0 Additionally, minor league
hands of the major league franchise.
clubs have no input as to who their own managers will be as the major
league affiliate wants to be certain that it controls which instructors are
25
given the responsibility of teaching its minor league players. ' Furthermore, the National Association must acquiesce to the demands and
authority of the Commissioner of MLB.252 Section 2(2) of the NLRA
states that all "persons" who act as employers or, directly or indirectly,
2 53
as agents of employers are covered as employers under the NLRA.
The entities excluded from NLRA coverage are: federal and state offices;

246. See id.
247. See supra note 151 and accompanying text
248. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
249. See ARTHUR T. JOHNSON, MINOR LVAGuE BASEBALL AND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 21, 22 (1993).
250. See National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, Inc., National Association
Agreement, (reprinted in THE BASEBALL BLuEBOOK 1995)).
251. See ARTHUR T. JOHNSON, MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 21, 22 (1993).
252. See National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, Inc., National Association
Agreement, in THE BASEBALL BLUEBOOK 402 (John Montague and Darlene Rice eds., 1995).
253. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994).
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Federal Reserve Banks; those subject to the Railway Labor Act; and

labor unions, when not acting as employers. 54 Parochial schools, as

employers, are also not covered. 25 MLB owners do not fall under any
of these categories, and therefore are not excluded as employers under
the NLRA. Additionally, Major League Baseball owners have already
been determined to be employers based on the formation of the MLBPA
as binding precedent.256 Also, it has been shown that the major leagues
retain almost exclusive control over the minor league players and
therefore, these players are the employees of MLB. Therefore, unionization of minor league baseball is legally possible, and the model to follow
is clear.
V. THE MODEL TO FOLLOW-HOCKEY
A.

FederalAntitrust Law and the National Hockey League

In order to properly analogize Major League Baseball to the
National Hockey League, a brief understanding of the current posture of
the reserve clause and antitrust law must be introduced. The National
Hockey League had a perpetual reserve system which operated similarly
to baseball's until 19727 when the World Hockey Association
("WHA")258 attempted to enjoin its operation. The WHA claimed that

the inclusion of a clause within all players' contracts giving the NIIL

254. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1994).
The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or
indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government
corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof,
or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or any
labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.

Id.
255. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 495 (1979).
256. See WALTER T. CHAMPION, FuNDAMiENTALS OF SPORTS LAW 437 (1990).
257. See Shant H. Chalian, Fourth and Goal: Player Restraintsin ProfessionalSports, A Look
Back andA LookAhead, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 593, 609 (citing Philadelphia World Hockey Club,
Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 480-85 (E.D. Pa. 1972)). Contracts
containing renewal options have been interpreted to be perpetual. See id at 609. But see Lemat Corp.
v. Barry, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240, 243 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); Central N.Y. Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 181
N.E.2d 506, 509-11 (Ohio 1961).
258. See id. (citing Philadelphia World Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. at 466 n.105 (noting the
WHA was a new rival league to the NHL and signed big star players, such as Bobby Hull of the
Chicago Blackhawks, to gain credibility quickly, and that in so doing, the WHA told players to
disregard the reserve clauses found in their present contracts)).
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clubs a permanent renewable option when the player's contract ended
259
created a monopoly for the NHL. This clause essentially allowed a
NIL hockey club to retain a player until that club unilaterally decided
260
the player was no longer needed within the organization. Therefore,
the WHA could not effectively compete with the NHL because it could
not sign any 26of1 the more established players without the consent of the
league itself.
In Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc., v. PhiladelphiaHockey
Club, Inc., 262 the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania issued a preliminary injunction against further use of the
6
reserve system in the NHL.2 Although the court issued the injunction
on federal law were
against the NIL, it noted that some restraints
2 4
efficiently.
operate
to
NHL
the
for
necessary
26
In McCourt v. CaliforniaSports, Inc. ', the NHL's reserve clause
2
came under fire once again. " Dale McCourt was a star hockey player
for the Detroit Red Wings, and in 1978 his contract was assigned to the
Los Angeles Kings.267 Under the NHL's free agency system at the
time, when a team signed a free agent, the signing team was required to
compensate the team that lost the free agent by assignment of player
268
contracts, draft choices or by payment of cash. McCourt was the
compensation player sent to the Los Angeles Kings after the Red Wings
269
has signed a Kings' free agent. McCourt refused to report to the
Kings and instead filed an antitrust suit alleging that the system under
which his contract could be awarded to any team without his or his
270
team's consent violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The reserve clause is clearly a per se violation of the Sherman Act
27
because it places limitations on trade. ' However, due to the fact that
the two parties had negotiated over the reserve clause during their first

259. See Michael H. Juarez, Baseball'sAntitrustExemption, 17 HAsTNGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
737, 747 (1995).

260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See PhiladelphiaWorld Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. at 462.
263. See id.

264.
265.
266.
267.

See id. at 486, 504.
600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
See id.
See id. at 1195-96.

268. See id. at 1195.

269. See id. at 1195-96.
270. See id.

271. See MeCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
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collective bargaining meetings, the NHL argued the labor exemption
established in Mackey v. National Football League 72 applied to this
case.273 The ultimate issue then became whether or not the reserve
clause had been legitimately negotiated between the respective parties to
the collective bargaining agreement. 2 4 The court found that the reserve
clause was negotiated seriously as a significant issue, and therefore
concluded that the reserve clause was exempt from antitrust law.275

Following the NHL strike in 1992, a new compensation system
emerged2 76 where the players were divided into three distinct groups.
Group I players are those twenty-four years of age or younger.277
Players in this group may choose whether their former team is entitled
to draft compensation or allow an arbitrator to select one of the club's
compensation offers if the player leaves via free agency.27 Group II
players, ages twenty-five through twenty-nine, have the same options as
Group I players, except compensation is determined by the player's new
salary.279 Group III players, age thirty and over, are unrestricted free
agents and no type of compensation to the former team is required."'
As a result of this agreement, there is 28no true free agency in the NIL
until a player reaches the age of thirty. '

272. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). The Mackey test set three principles a reserve system must
meet in order to become exempt from the antitrust laws. They are as follows: (1) Where the restraint
on trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship, the national labor
policy favoring collective bargaining may be given preeminence over the antitrust law; (2) the
subject of that collective bargaining must be a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; (3) the
agreement sought to be exempted must be the product of a bona fide arm's length agreement. See
id. at 614.
273. See McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1198.
274. See id.
275. See id.at 1193.
276. See Shant H. Chalian, Fourth and Goal: PlayerRestraintsin ProfessionalSports, A Look
Back andA Look Ahead, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 593, 622 (1989). If a Group I player chooses draft
pick compensation to his old team, that team also gets a right of first refusal. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id.No matter what choice a Group H player makes, the former team gets right of first
refusal. See id. Additionally, the higher the new salary is, the greater the compensation is for the old
team, in the form of draft picks. See id.
280. See id.
281. See id.; see also Ian Craig Pulver, A Face Off Between the National Hockey League and
the NationalHockey League PlayersAssociation: The GoalA More CompetitivelyBalancedLeague,
2 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 39, 49 n.56 (1992). The St. Louis Blues gave up five first round draft picks
as compensation for signing Scott Stevens from the Washington Capitals in 1990. See id. The next
year the Blues had to relinguish Stevens to the New Jersey Devils in compensation for signing
Brendon Shanahan. See id.at 50. The Blues then re-signed Stevens from the Devils. See id. The ultimate result was an arbitration award of five first round draft picks. See id. at 49-52.
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Following the 103 day lockout during the 1994-95 NHL season,
282 An
once again new rules regarding free agency were instituted.
$850,000 rookie salary cap for draftees was created, and the Group I
23
salary arbitration and free agency were eliminated. 1 Group HI free
agency became more restricted as the age requirement was increased in
order to become an unrestricted free agent. 2' Although the salary cap
was eliminated, except for the rookie cap, the players lost on the free
agency and salary arbitration issues.285
The reserve clause also allows NHL clubs to retain drafted
players28 6 for two years following the draft. 287 For the two years, the
28
player is under the complete authority of the drafting NHL club. A
player can be cut at any time and depending on the contract he has
signed and the collective bargaining agreement, he may or may not be
29
eligible to receive severance pay and benefits. After two years, the
team can then offer the player a contract or in the alternative, put the
player back into the draft for that year.290
After being drafted, most players are designated to junior hockey
leagues which are very similar in function to rookie ball and the SingleA minor league baseball system.29 ' Successful players are then sent to
either the East Coast Hockey League ("ECHL"), International Hockey
292
League ("1H"), or American Hockey League ("AHI"). During their
entire stay in any one of these leagues, players are subject to the
293
authority of the affiliated NHL club regarding player movement.
There are no rules or restraints concerning the shuffling of players back

282. Jim Smith, Players OK Pact,So It's "Game On", NEWSDAY, Jan. 14, 1995, at A36.

283. See id.
284. See id.
285. Helene Elliot, For NHL, It's Back to Work Hockey: Despite Some Misgivings About the
Terms, Players Vote to Ratify New Six-Year Contract:Shortened Season Opens Friday,L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 1995, at 1.
286. See Telephone Interview with John Gentile, Business Administrator, New York Rangers
(Feb. 16, 1996). The draft was recently reduced from eleven rounds to nine rounds as a result of the
new collective bargaining agreement in the NHL. See id.
287. See id.

288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id. These junior leagues are: the Westem Hockey League; the Ontario Hockey League;
and the Quebec Hockey League. See id. Each team at this level can only have two twenty year olds
in an attempt to keep the level of play and ability equal. See id.
292. See id. Essentially; it is similar to being promoted from Single A to either Double A or
Triple A baseball. See id

293. See id.
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and forth from league to league. 294 However, once the contract period
expires,2 95 a player is free to offer his services to any team.296
The parallels between MLB and the NIL are strikingly similar.
Presently, MLB has a six year free agency guideline,297 while the NHL
has over a thirty year age limit. 298 Since most MLB players do not
enter the big leagues before their twenty-second birthday, 9 free
agency in both leagues is quite similar. Additionally, both leagues have
a legal reserve clause, with the NiH's upheld pursuant to the nonstatutory labor exemption."' Therefore, both minor league systems are forced
to deal with a legal reserve clause. Also, the minor league systems
themselves are strikingly similar in terms of their functions and number
of levels. However, one significant difference does exist, one system is
unionized while the other is not.3 ' 1
B.

The ProfessionalHockey Players' Association

The Professional Hockey Players' Association ("PHPA") represents
professional hockey players in the IL, AHL and ECHL. 30 2 The PHPA
organized the AHL in 1968-69, the IHL in 1985-86, and the ECHL in
1995.303 The total number of members within the union exceed 1200,
spread out over fifty-eight teams throughout North America.3 ' The
PHPA is recognized by the NLRB as the bargaining unit for all hockey

294. See id.
295. See id. Generally these contract periods are for three years. See id.
296. See Telephone Interview with Richard Evans, Director of Legal & Business Affairs,

Professional Hockey Players Association (Feb. 16. 1996).
297. See discussion supra note 170.
298. See Telephone Interview with John Gentile, Business Administrator, New York Rangers
(Feb. 20, 1996).
299. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG

BusINEss OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 106 (1992).
300. See McCourt, 460 F. Supp. at 904.
301. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
302. Harry Minium, Union Coming to ECHL? Players Associationfor PHPA Has Met With
PlayersFrom All 18 ECHL Teams, Including Admirals, VIRGnM-PILOT LEDGER STAR, Feb. 15,

1995, at Cl.
303. See Telephone Interview with Richard Evans, Director of Legal and Business Affairs,

Professional Hockey Players Association (Feb. 16, 1996).
304. See id.
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players enrolled in the Association."' The main function of the PFIPA
is to negotiate for wages, hours and working conditions, as well as other
06
benefits, through the collective bargaining process. The PU-PA also
represents players individually and collectively in grievances and
7
arbitration, ranging from antitrust violations to fines." The three
8
leagues comprising the PUPA differ in their purposes and functions."
The AHL is essentially the farm system of the NHL," existing as
t°
minor league baseball's equivalent of the AAA-level. The goal of
each team in the AH is to have a NHL affiliate." Therefore, most
.players in the AHL are on two way contracts, however some can be on
12
one way contracts or even three way contracts.
313
Wages and working conditions in the AHL are decent. The
average salary in the AHL was $37,000 in 1994314 but entry fees for
315
teams in the AL as of 1994 were $1 million. A new collective
bargaining agreement was recently negotiated, however details of that
316
agreement were not disclosed at the time this note was written. This

305. See id. This includes all players enrolled throughout the three developmental leagues. See
id.
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. See id.
309. See Lindsay Kramer, AHL Has Become Hockey's FarmSystem, Syracuse Fans Will Soon
See Plenty ofPlayers Destined ForNHL Rinks, POST STANDARD, Apr. 26, 1994, at D1. Noting that
seventy percent, over 400, of the NHL's players are AHL alumni. See id. Seventeen members of the
1993 Stanley Cup champions were AHL alumni as were sixteen players on the 1994 NHL All-Star
team. See iL
310. See Telephone Interview with Richard Evans, Director of Legal & Business Affairs,
Professional Hockey Players Association (Feb. 16, 1996). The average age of a player in the AHL
is between twenty-two and twenty-four years old. See id.
311. See id. Affiliation agreements are where an NHL club is able to send a certain number of
players to a minor league club and retain all rights- over the players. See id. The affiliation
agreements themselves specify who pays the salary and benefits of the players. See id These
agreements are not available to the public or to the PHPA. See id.
312. See id. An example of a two way contract would be if the Boston Bruins sign "X' to a two
way contract and then decide they don't need him on the Bruins, they can send him to their AHL
affiliate, Providence, who would pick up a portion of the contract. See id. There are also one way
contracts where the NHL club pays the entire salary and even three way contracts where costs could
be split between three leagues. See Telephone Interview with Tim Roberts, Former ECHL and AHL
Player and Former Union Representative, Professional Hockey Players Association (Feb. 16, 1996)
(describing the different types of contracts).
313. See id.
314. This data is conclusive according to a survey done by the PHPA. See Kramer, supra note
309.
315. See Kramer, supra note 309.
316. See Telephone Interview with Richard Evans, Director of Legal & Business Affairs,
Professional Hockey Players Association (Feb. 16, 1996).
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new agreement, however, may have a significant effect on the previous
benefits including health and welfare, dental insurance, life insurance,
disability insurance, transportation, relocation expenses, play-off pools,
training camp allowances as well as daily per diem.317
Compared to the low salaries of AHL players, the Triple-A baseball
players are grossly underpaid, as a player who has never made it to the
major leagues generally earns between $10,000 and $15,000 per
season. 31 8 The Class A player makes as little as $650.00 per month,
and management shuttles players from league to league so they do not
have to pay any of the bonuses that a player may have negotiated.31 9
The comparisons became more extreme when the IHL is considered.
The IHL salaries, per diem allowance and franchise entry fees are all
examples of the successes a union can engineer when dealing with a
minor league system. 320 A joint IHL/PHPA Marketing/Licensing
Committee3 2' exists to enhance the overall marketability of the league
and its players. 32 Television money and national sponsorship money
is also divided amongst the teams and the P-PA. 3z In addition, an
advanced player compensation system has been enacted whereby money
is paid to the league and to the PIPA if a team is above the league

317. See id.
318. Lee Lowenfish, Fielder'sNonchoice: MinorLeaguersMust Choose:Side With Owners Who
Exploit Them? Or A Union That Snubs Them?, VILLAGE VoicE, Feb. 21, 1995, at 122.
319. See id.
320. See Doug Mitchell, 1HL Reaches Collective BargainingDeal, HOUSTON PoST, Nov. 18,
1994, at B8 (stating the average salary is $62,000 per season). According to the IHLPHPA
Collective Bargaining Agreement, the minimum salary is $25,000, or $500.00 for players signed to
a twenty-five game try-out agreement. Entry fees into the IHL are $6 million. See Lindsay Kramer,
AHL Has Become Hockey's Farm System, Syracuse Fans Will Soon See Plenty ofPlayersDestined
for NHL Rinks, POST STANDARD, Apr. 26, 1994, at Dl. Per diem allowance for the 1995-96 season
is $40.00/day. See IHLIPHPA Collective Bargaining Agreement 10 (signed Oct. 2, 1995). Additionally, The IHL team pays for travel expenses to training camp and home following the season for
players and their families and the same should a player be traded. See idJ
321. See IHLPHPA Collective Bargaining Agreement 13 (signed Oct. 2, 1995). Each club must
contact the IHL and PHPA if intending to use Player Likenesses for Club promotions or retail sales.
See id. Both groups must agree on issues for promotion or the issue goes to binding arbitration. See
id.
322. See id.at 10-11. This includes, helmet and jersey sponsorship, trading card promotions and
licenses and other sponsorships. See id. at 13-14. According to section 9(a) of the collective
bargaining agreement, the IHL pays the PHPA a guaranteed minimum payment under the royalty,
revenue-sharing plan of $50,000 in 1994-1995, $60,000 in 1995-1996 and $70,000 in 1996-1997.
See id.
323. See id. at 22. Proceeds received by the PHPA for these purposes are use toward players
pensions and health benefits. See id. The IHL guarantees a minimum payment for television of
$50,000, $60,000 and $70,000 for the 1994-1995, 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 seasons, respectively.
See id.
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average. 3 4 Additional guidelines are set if a team has a NHL Partial
Affiliation Agreement.32 5
The reserve system negotiated allows a team the right to match
another team's offer for one season after the player's last contract season
326
which expires after that year. In addition, if a team has an option
contract on a player, that player must be notified if the option will be
picked up by July 1st and in the event notification is not given, the
32 7
player becomes an unrestricted free agent.
Moreover, health and welfare benefits were secured under the IIL
Collective Bargaining Agreement whereby money is paid by each team
328
to the PIPA Trust Fund. All players signed by a team are eligible
32 9
for team payment of their insurance premium. Finally, arbitration
procedures are outlined as are plans for a 401(K) pension plan, rights to
opinion and surgeon of the player's choice, all paid for
a second medical
330 club.
by the
This agreement has allowed the IHL to become an alternative,
33
professional hockey league. ' When players cannot make it to the

324. See id. at 18-19.
Divided in to A, B and C they are as follows: (A) If a team spends on player
for a
compensation in excess of the league average, plus 15% of the league average,
the
season, that team shall pay an amount to the league office equal to 50% of
on
spends
team
a
If
(B)
average.
league
the
of
excess
in
compensation the team spent
for
player compensation in excess of the league average, plus 25% of the league average,
of the
a season, that team shall pay an amount to the league office equal to 100%
on
compensation the team spent in excess of the league average. (C) If a team spends
for
average,
league
the
of
50%
plus
average
league
the
of
excess
in
player compensation
if the
a season, that team shall pay an amount to the league office equal to 200%
compensation the team spent in excess of the league average.
Id.
the IHL where
325. See id. at 19-20. The funds for this are divided among the PHPA and
for the players.
accounts
pension/retirement
for
used
again
once
are
moneys collected by the PHPA
See id. at 18-19.
326. See id. at 30.
327. See id. at 31.
to pay
328. See id. at 32. Under Article XII, Health and Welfare, each team is required
See id.
$2,523.00 to the PHPA Trust Fund with an initial one time team payment of $2,500.00.
329. See id.
See id.
330. See id. at 36. Consultation by the player with the club physician is required.
Business Affairs,
&
Legal
of
Director
Evans,
Richard
with
Interview
Telephone
See
331.
Professional Hockey Players Association (Feb. 16, 1996).
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NHL, many now jump from the AIIL to the IHL.332 Many 1-L teams
also have limited NHL affiliates, but the age in the 11TL is now rising, so
the NIL teams want their young athletic players playing against players
with similar youth, and therefore, most players are sent to the AHL or
the ECIL.333
Until recently, the players with the least amount of rights were
clearly those in the ECHL. Players in this league did not have any
protection of license and marketing rights or even modest food per diems
because they were not represented by the PIPA.334 Additionally, travel
conditions were terrible335 while owners fill arenas.336
The biggest concern was the fact that players in the ECIHL were not
under contract. 337 There was a perpetual try-out agreement which
means a club could release a player within 24 hours of providing
33
notice.338
The released player was not entitled to severance pay or
health benefits as they were simply terminated on the spot.339 While

332. See id. For example, Todd Simon of the Buffalo Sabres had been up and down from the
AHL affiliate in Rochester, New York to Buffalo. See id He is twenty-four years old and had played

a half a dozen games in the NHL. See id He realized he was not going to stick in the NHL, so he

jumped to the Los Angeles Thunder of the IHL. See id. His salary increased from $35,000 to
$110,000 with the move. See id Additionally, the Thunder have inserted an out clause allowing him

to go to an NHL team if offered. See i.
333. See id.
334. See id. Food per diem for away games is approximately $18.00 which for a hockey player

is completely outrageous because of the great shape these players need to maintain. See id License
and marketing rights rest in the complete control of the ECHL with all revenue for player likenesses
going to the ECHL owners. See iad

335. See Telephone Interview with Tim Roberts, former minor league hockey player and team
union representative, Professional Hockey Players Association (Feb. 16, 1996). Travel occurs by bus,
with home and home series occurring on the weekends. See id. Therefore, after a Friday night home
game, a team has to board a bus and travel to its opponent's home arena to play on a Saturday night.

See id Also, when Roberts played in the AHL, he once played a span of sixteen to eighteen games
in the month of February. See id.
336. See id. Tickets sell for $6.00-$8.00 a seat with attendance ranging from 4,000 to 10,000
for an eighty game season. See id.
337. See id.
338. See id.
339. See id.
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340 a three year veteran
attempting to maintain a youthful league
342
34' makes older players end their hockey careers early.
rule
The players in the ECHL voted to select the PHPA as its exclusive
43
bargaining representative in 1995," and an agreement has recently
345
been reached. 3 " An increase in the salary cap, better347health and
a partner348
insurance benefits, 346 a share in the post season revenue, allowance
diem
per
higher
a
and
fees
ship concerning player likeness
349
highlight the labor deal. These accomplishments mark the positive
effects a union can attain on the wages, working conditions, and benefits
of the minor league athlete without dismantling the league itself. Had the
PHPA not unionized the players in the ECHL, these changes would not
have occurred.
According to Richard Evans, the Director of Legal & Business
Affairs for the PHPA, there are no serious problems with having such a
50
large and diverse membership. In negotiating each collective bargaining agreement, the PHPA realizes there are different economic realities
351
at each level and addresses its strategy and goals accordingly. ' The
only drawback is that because of player movement throughout the
system, player representatives are difficult to maintain, and therefore, a
352
lack of stability may develop. However, because the same union is

340. See id. The average age of the ECHL player is between twenty-one and twenty-two years
old, many of which are recent college graduates or former junior hockey players. See id.
341. See idThis is where a player is considered a veteran after three seasons. Only three of
these players are allowed on a roster. See id.
342. See id. Tim Roberts likens this to "age discrimination." See id. It should be noted that
Roberts played in the ECHL for four and a half years while making brief stays in the AHL. See id.
is
He is also a graduate of Rensselaer Polytechnical Institute (RPI) in Rensselaer, New York and
currently a stockbroker. Id.
for
343. See Telephone Interview with Richard Evans, Director of Legal and Business Affairs
1996).
16,
(Feb.
Association
the Professional Hockey Players
at E3.
344. See John Packett, ECHL Notes, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 3, 1996,

next
345. See id. Salary cap (per team per week) will go up from $7,500 last season to $7,750
season, $8,000 in 1997-1998, and $8,250 in 1998-1999. See id.
for the first
346. See id. Players will receive severance and career-ending disability payments
See id.
time.
first
the
for
insurance
health
time. See id. Players also will be eligible for off-ice
for the
$2,400
to
losers
first-round
for
$180
from
ranged
which
pool,
playoff
The
id.
347. See
season.
1998-1999
the
through
year
each
slightly
league champions of the 1995 season, will increase
See id.
be $24
348. See id. The meal money allowance for each player, which was $20 last season, will
id.
See
1998-1999.
in
$26
and
1997-1998,
in
$25
season,
next
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. See id.
352. See id.
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already established in the AI-L and the IL, the players remain confident
in the union and its abilities.353
VI. EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION ON MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
A.

The Owners

It is extremely difficult to predict the effects a union would bring
to the minor league baseball system. Much of this analysis will depend
on many intangibles-subjects and issues that can only be speculated
upon with no guarantees. However, some assumptions can be drawn. It
is highly plausible that the minor league union would not, nor could not,
want to come in and expect to make sweeping, drastic changes immediately. Change must be made over time3" and, therefore, making
modest improvements would be the ideal path to pursue. I would suggest
the minor league baseball union start with goals similar to that of the
PHPA in negotiating the ECHL collective bargaining agreement. Increase
of wages, benefits, pensions, job security and health care would be
foremost on the list. It is reasonable to conclude that the union would
recognize the economic realities of the system and the owners ability to
contribute. Nothing radical such as testing the labor exemption on the
amateur draft would be tried.
With reasonable goals like these in mind, what would be the results?
Surely, the MLB owners would continue to argue that the minor league
systems are no longer affordable or practical under these demands. If
major league teams, under greater economic pressure and higher minor
league salaries, decide to economize on their player development budgets
and reduce the number of farm teams per major league team, then they
will have more money available to support each team and its ballpark.355 If a major league team does decide to reduce its number of
affiliated minor league teams, it has to do so at the Single-A or Rookie
League level.3 56 Only one team is allowed at the Triple-A and DoubleA level, but many major league teams maintain two or three Single-A
and rookie level teams.357 For each club that is eliminated at this level,

353. See id.
354. See id.
355. See ANDREW ZIMBAuST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG
BUSINESS OF OuR NATIONAL PASTIME 106 (1992).

356. See id. at 105.
357. See id.
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the parent club can save over $200,000 which is approximately one-fifth
3 58
the amount it pays the average major league ballplayer.
It is possible if the major league teams choose to downsize, rival
9
leagues would begin to form at the lower levels." A rival minor
league would serve to pressure MLB to deal with its "notoriously
' 36 These management
inefficient and wasteful management practices.
wastes are usually paid for by the fan, the umpire, other employees and
the players, instead, the owners would be forced to run their businesses
more efficiently.3 6' Minor league baseball does not exist to make a
profit, but exists for the sole purpose to aid their major league parents.362 However, there is no reason why the focus of minor league
baseball cannot be on both of these purposes-money and aid. The
attendance figures for minor league baseball are increasing, and serious
marketing possibilities could be opened, if properly explored. All players
would be asking for are reasonable requests which could be granted.
B. Not Another Strike
What about the threat of strikes in the minor league system? As
Mickey Brantley, a former Seattle Mariner outfielder who played in over
1,100 minor league games, said "[w]e know we're targeting the wrong
group.., we couldn't walk out; we don't make what the big leaguers
3
do."363 However, players are entitled to strike. " According to section
7 of the NLRA, employees can engage in "concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection" which
most certainly includes striking.365 In fact, the power to strike is
protected because it is illustrative of the impetus to bargain collectively.36 Collective bargaining works because it is less expensive to sit
down and work through issues than it is to suffer through a lockout or

358. See id. at 105.
359. See id. at 108.
360. See id. at 110.
361. See id.

362. See Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues,73 TENN. L. REV. 643,691 (1989) (citation
omitted).

363. Spitting Mad Over Tobacco Ban, Team to Keep a Tight Lip With Press Spitting Mad,
FirebirdsKeep a Tight Lip, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 18, 1993, at Fl. Brantley was referring to a ban
of tobacco products in minor league baseball while allowing it in major league baseball. See id.
364. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163 (1994).

365. Id.
366. See WALTER T. CHAwMION, FUNDAmENTALS OF SPORTS LAW 438 (1990) (noting that
strikes and other concerted activities are a major part of American labor).
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a strike.367 In baseball a strike can be even more devastating because
the season is relatively short, and time that is lost cannot be made
up.3 68 Furthermore, if a developing player does not work on his skills,
there is a strong possibility of deterioration.169 There are no other
alternatives for professional athletes because there are no alternative
leagues to turn towards. 70
When employees decide to strike they should determine if the strike
is lawful and if the potential benefits outweigh the risks.3 7' Determining the lawfulness of economic and unfair labor practice strikes"7 is
the decision of the NLRB. 7 These cases are decided on a fact specific
basis by the NLRB. 37
Additionally, if players decide to strike, the owners could decide to
replace them. The effectiveness of the method can be questioned 375 and
therefore, players must consider the potential damage that can occur.376
Additionally, employees do not get paid while out on strike which
creates the hesitancy to strike.377 Due to the drive and determination a
minor league baseball player has to reach the "SHOW,"378 and the
small amount of money a player makes while journeying, the likelihood
of a work stoppage is minimal. However, the mere presence of the union

367. See id.
368. See id.
369. See id.
370. See id.
371. See Steven L. Ukeiley, No Salary, No Union, No Collective Bargaining: Scholarship
Athletes Are an Employer's Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 167, 220 (1996).
372. An unfair labor practice strike is a potential employee response to an alleged 8(a) violation
by an employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1994). See ARCHIBALD Cox Er AL., LABOR LAW CASES
AND MATERiALS 487 (1 1th ed. 1991) (stating an employer must reinstate the employee after an
unfair labor practice has been committed). An economic strike occurs if a strike is not an unfair
labor practice strike. See id. If an economic strike occurs, an employer is only obligated to place the
employee on a "preferential hiring list." Essentially, when a position becomes available, the employer
must go to the former employees first. See Charles W. Nugent, A Comparison of the Right to
Organize and Bargain Collectively in the United States and Mexico: NAFTA 's Side Accords and
ProspectsFor Reform, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAW, 197, 208-09 (1994).
373. See Charles W. Nugent, A Comparison ofthe Right to Organize and BargainCollectively
in the UnitedStates and Mexico: NAFTA 's Side Accords and Prospectsfor Reform, 7 TRANSNAT'L
LAW. 197, 200-01 (1994).
374. See id.
375. The damage of hiring replacement players can deteriorate an already bad relationship
between owner and player. Peter King, The NFL Strike May Be Over, But Now It's Time
For... Chaos,NEWSDAY, Oct. 18, 1987, at 40.
376. See Ukeiley, supra note 371, at 220.
377. See Ukeiley, supra note 371, at 221.
378. The "Show" is a slang nickname for major league baseball. See Craig Yuhas, Dynamite Set
to Start InauguralSeason, DETROIT NEWS, May 17, 1996, at F7.
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and the tools it brings gives the minor league athlete weapons he never
dreamed of possessing.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The abilities of the PUPA and the power of a union in general, have
allowed the players of the IHL and AHL to lead respectable lives in
terms of health care, retirement funds and salary. This is the primary
reason why the players in the ECHL have followed the lead of their
fellow hockey players-the hope of an improved employment. These
players can spend years in the minor leagues doing a job they love, but
it is a job and it is their primary source of income. The PUPA realized
this, and capitalized on the represented players exhibiting tremendous
potential.
Players in the minor leagues of baseball have that same potential.
The reserve clause will not be revoked and the hierarchy of MLB will
not suddenly raise the level of wages, benefits and working conditions
that exist today in minor league baseball. The quickest and most efficient
way to guarantee improvement in wages, working conditions and benefits
can be seen through the PUPA model. Minor league baseball players
must have the courage to break the status quo, one that has existed for
years in our National Pastime. Their brethren in minor league hockey
have surpassed them, and it is time for them to follow a successful
example. The unionization of minor league baseball can benefit all the
parties involved morally and financially.
David M Szuchman
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